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Regulating Environmental and Safety Hazards of
Agricultural Biotechnology For A Sustainable World
George Van Cleve*
Agricultural biotechnology today has considerable support in the
U.S. agricultural community as an important means to improve
agriculture. In certain other parts of the world, the value and
perceived dangers of agricultural biotechnology are a subject of
intense debate. A key task for U.S. policymakers is to assure that the
regulatory and liability system that controls the development of
agricultural biotechnology strikes a proper balance between the
progressive and successful development of new technology and the
need to protect the public and the environment from harm.
This Article seeks to illuminate the proper approach for regulating
the environmental and safety hazards of agricultural biotechnology.
This Article examines the structure and principles of such regulation
in view of generally accepted principles of environmental regulation
designed to create a sustainable world. The extent to which differing
biotechnology regulatory approaches chosen by the United States and
other parts of the world are consistent with sustainability principles
should assist us in examining whether improvements in
biotechnology regulation would be desirable.
This Article first presents an overview of key legal principles that
support sustainability. This Article then reviews the major alleged
risks of agricultural biotechnology. It then describes the existing U.S.
* Partner, Van Cleve & Eder, Washington, D.C.; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1977. Mr.
Van Cleve wishes to offer warm thanks to Luis M. Acosta, of the District of Columbia bar, for
his substantial research assistance with this Article. Mr. Van Cleve also wishes to offer special
thanks to Kristen Byrnes Floom, of Van Cleve and Eder, for her substantial research assistance,
and in particular, for her work in researching and writing the StarlinkT case study discussed
below. The views presented here, however, are solely those of the author. This Article was
prepared for the 2002 National Association Environmental Law Societies' (NAELS)
Conference: "Sustainable Agriculture: Food for the Future" held at Washington University

School of Law in St. Louis on March 15-17, 2002.
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and European agricultural biotechnology regulatory system designed
to control those risks. Next, this Article analyzes the existing U.S.
regulatory system using sustainability principles. In the course of that
analysis, this Article considers lessons to be derived from three case
studies: the permitting of Starlink Tm corn, the discovery of Mexican
maize containing genetically engineered corn genes, and the possible
permitting of transgenic salmon for ocean fish farming. This Article
also considers lessons from the broader regulatory history of pestprotected plants. Based on the analysis of sustainability issues related
to agricultural biotechnology, this Article concludes that despite the
obvious, substantial benefits that agricultural biotechnology can
confer on society, the United States needs to improve its regulatory
process to ensure a proper weighing of the full social benefits and
costs of agricultural biotechnology and to clarify liability rules
governing the use of agricultural biotechnology. These reforms
should provide both better public protection and increased public
support for the agricultural biotechnology industry.
I. INTRODUCTION
The progress of agricultural biotechnology is often measured in
the popular imagination by news accounts of groundbreaking
scientific developments such as the cloning of Dolly, the sheep, by
Scottish scientists. Although less sensational, an indication of
potentially greater consequence is a recent report by the National
Research Council (NRC) discussing the growing number of
transgenic pest-protected crops commercially planted in the United
States.'
1. Comm. on Genetically Modified Pest-Protected Plants, Bd. on Agric. and Natural
Ress., Nat'l Research Council Genetically Modified Pest-Protected Plants: Science and
Regulation xi (2000) [hereinafter NRC Report]:
Transgenic pest-protected crops were first commercially planted in the United States in
1995. Since then the acreage planted to transgenic crops has increased rapidly with
some 70 million acres being grown in the United States, and 98.6 globally in 1999. Of
this acreage, a large percentage (for example, 30 million acres in the US in 1999) is
planted with transgenic pest-protected crop varieties containing the Bacillus
thuringiensis(Bt) gene which confers protection from certain insect pests and with
varieties that are herbicide-tolerant. In 1998, about 25% of the US cotton acreage and
21% of the corn acreage was planted with varieties containing Bt genes.
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Remarkably, these millions of acres of crops were planted even
though the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had not then
adopted final regulations governing the approval process for
transgenic pest-protected plants.2 Although the EPA's proposed
regulations have been on the books since 1994 and have generally
been implemented in practice, the regulations were not finalized,
even in part, until 2001. In fact, some aspects of the proposed
regulations are still not finalized, including certain exemptions
recently found to be scientifically questionable, or in some cases even
indefensible, by the NRC.4 Moreover, probable violations of the
inadequate EPA regulatory restrictions on the use of a genetically
engineered corn strain, Starlinkrm corn led to the "voluntary"
removal of its EPA registration, the withdrawal of millions of acres
of corn from the market, and the proposal of substantial changes in
regulatory rules governing biotechnology plant crops in both the
United States and Europe. 5
These regulatory failures suggest that the actual marketplace use
of genetically modified plants in the United States appears to be
substantially outpacing the ability of the U.S. regulatory system to
effectively control their use. In itself, this lack of effective control
does not indicate that there is an inherent problem with agricultural
biotechnology, but it does indicate, very strongly, that this is a good
time to take a dispassionate look at whether the performance of the
U.S. regulatory and liability system can be improved.
The remarkably rapid and widespread introduction of pestprotected crops in the United States, where most of the world's
2. See id.
3. The EPA's final rule on plant-incorporated protectants (PIP), issued July 19, 2001,
clarifies the relationship between plants and plant-incorporated protectants and establishes new
regulations specifically for PIPs. See Regulations Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act for Plant-Incorporated Protectants, 66 Fed. Reg. 37772 (July 19, 2001).
4. The NRC Report, issued in 2000, criticized the EPA's proposed exemptions that
would categorically apply to all viral coat proteins and transgenic pest-protectants derived from
sexually compatible plants. See NRC Report, supra note 1, at 13. The EPA's final rule, issued
in July 2001, fails to determine the propriety of these two exemptions. See Plant-Incorporated
Protectants, 66 Fed. Reg. 37855 (proposed July 19, 2001). In fact, the EPA placed the entire
NRC Report in the docket for rulemakings related to certain proposals on PIPs, and requested
public comment on the document, particularly with regard to its conclusions about these

exemptions. See id.
5. See infra Part VI.A.
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existing acreage of such crops is planted, is in striking contrast to the
situation in Europe, where many genetically modified U.S. products,
such as BT corn, could not be sold for several years and now face
sharply increased regulation.6
This contrast arose because over the past twenty years the United
States and most other countries adopted divergent approaches to the
environmental and safety hazard regulation of agricultural
biotechnology.7 The U.S. government accepts the view that
agricultural biotechnology is merely a technical extension of
traditional agricultural selective breeding practices, which it regards
6. According to Jeffrey Francer
(As of 2000], sales of com from the United States to the European Union (EU) have
been halted since 1997. EU nations barred the import of corn and its by-productstrade that had once averaged more than 2.1 million tons annually and accounted for
almost 5 percent of all U.S. exports. While farmers in the states had been exporting
corn to Europe since the early days of our Republic, this facet of international trade is
effectively at a standstill, because portions of the American com have been grown
from genetically modified seeds. The European embargo of American-grown corn
threatens $500 million of annual U.S. corn exports, and at the time of this writing, the
trade dispute has still not been resolved.
Jeffrey K. Francer, Frankenstein Foods or Flavor Savers?: Regulating Agricultural
Biotechnology in the United States andEuropean Union, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 257, 257-58
(2000) (footnotes omitted).
7. As used in this Article, the term "agricultural biotechnology" means genetic
modification of food or animals using recombinant DNA or cell fusion technology and includes
items such as plant gene expression to produce toxins (sometimes referred to as "pest-protected
plants"), cloning, and animal production of human drugs or vaccines. Animal cloning and drug
production involve complex additional issues that fall outside the scope of this Article.
From another perspective, biotechnology could be described as:
allow[ing] scientists to manipulate genetic material, whether it involves the cloning
and propagation of plants that possess the desired characteristics, or the creation of
new varieties from existing stock. Biotechnological procedures allow scientists to
move specific genes within an organism, or from one organism to another, whether the
gene is from an organism of the same species or a different species. Generally
speaking, the product of these processes can be described as "bioengineered,"
"genetically engineered," or "transgenic." In the broadest sense, an agricultural
product that has been genetically altered using biotechnological techniques is
frequently called a "Genetically Modified Organism" (GMO) or a "Living Modified
Organism" (LMO).
See Holly Saigo, Note, Agricultural Biotechnology and the Negotiation of the Biosafety
Protocol, 12 GEO. INT'L. ENVTL. L. REv. 779, 783 (2000).
This Article does not consider the moral, ethical, equity, and property rights or related
economic efficiency issues raised by biotechnology except to the extent they arise within the
framework of sustainability.
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as both time-tested and largely harmless or self-correcting, and

regulates biotechnology products accordingly.8 The first major
National Academy of Sciences' review of biotechnology in 1987
concluded that biotechnology products, rather than processes, should
be the subject of risk analysis for regulation.9 The recent NRC Report
on genetically modified pest-protected plants reaffirmed this

conclusionot°

The remainder of the world, however, considers that recombinant
DNA and cell fusion biotechnology are capable of creating organisms
and products that could not exist under conditions of natural

selection. Although the European Union (EU), for example,
acknowledges that there are benefits to agricultural biotechnology, it

also has substantial concerns about the risks of that technology." As
8. See Francer, supra note 6, at 265-66. Francer explains that the U.S. government
adopted a "Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology" in 1986, under which
"foods, drugs, medical devices, biologics, and pesticides developed through modem
biotechnology would be regulated within the same statutory framework as comparable products
using traditional techniques." Id. Furthermore, Francer notes that "[i]mplicit in the Coordinated
Framework's policy-that additional legislation would not be needed to regulate
biotechnology-are the assumptions that products developed through biotechnology do not
pose inherent risks to human health and that the level of risk from biotechnology depends on
the characteristics and consumption of individual products." Id. at 267.
9. NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS., INTRODUCTION OF RECOMBiNANT DNA-ENGIRD
ORGAiSMS INTo THE ENV'T: KEY IssuEs (1987) (as quoted in NRC Report, supra note 1, at

5).
10. See NRC Report, supranote 1, at 43-45.
11. The EU's view of agricultural biotechnology can be summarized as follows:
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) or 'living modified organisms' (LMOs) offer
considerable potential for increasing agricultural productivity, but at the risk of
unpredicted and unintended impacts on existing biological systems. For example, the
transfer of genetic material from genetically modified agricultural crops to wild plants
could reduce their genetic diversity, a potential problem where native ecosystems and
agricultural land are adjacent. The traits of herbicide resistance and stress tolerance in
GM crops have the potential to be transferred to weed species, increasing the
competitive advantage of weeds over native varieties and reducing the susceptibility of
the weeds to herbicides (CEAT 1994). There may also be direct effects, such as the
toxicity of some GMO pollen to honeybees.
GM crops, and possibly livestock, can supplant native varieties (land races) by
commercial pressures such as patenting and seed monopolies. These practices can
present a direct threat to agrobiodiversity. They may also present a threat to "Food
security", by reducing system complexity and thereby increasing the risk of
widespread crop failure. Further challenges to sustainable development could arise as a
consequence of control of the technology by a limited number of multinational
corporations, and commercial pressures to develop monopoly mechanisms such as the
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a result, the EU is prepared to allow countries to bar agricultural
biotechnology products unless conclusive scientific evidence of their
lack of harm is provided.'"
This broad difference in regulatory approaches to agricultural
biotechnology is based, in part, on the differing cultures, economies,
and political and natural environments of different parts of the
world. 3 It would be prudent to consider whether this apparently
fundamental difference of view on biotechnology regulation is based
solely on such sociopolitical factors, or may, instead, have some
grounding in ecological principles. After all, the European approach
to biotechnology regulation is similar, in important respects, to the
way in which U.S. environmental laws regulate most environmental
hazards, since individual American states are permitted by federal
law to set health and safety standards for environmental risks in
excess of federal minimum standards in many cases.' 4 One way of
answering the question about the ecological grounding of these
differing regulatory approaches is to examine biotechnology
'terminator gene'. The risk of adverse impacts from GMOs on biodiversity
necessitates the development of international protocols for their transport, handling
and use. Where technical, financial, institutional and human resources to address GMO
biosafety are lacking, risks of negative impacts are higher. Use of GMOs requires the
agreement of concerned states if there is any potential for adverse effects on
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.
European Union, Toward Sustainable Economic Development and Co-operation 285 (2000),
version 1.0, availableat http://europa.eu.int/commldevelopment/sector/environmentlenvinteg/
env-integration manual/pdf/BiodiversityBPGuide.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2002).
12. The Cartagena Biosafety Protocol (Protocol) represents formal international
recognition of this view. See CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY TO THE CONVENTION ON
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (Feb. 23, 2000), available at http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety
protocol.asp# (last visited Jan. 13, 2001). The Protocol contains exemptions for pharmaceuticals
and certain other biotechnology products. Id. at 5-6.
13. The EU exists, after all, primarily as an effort to overcome the heavily protectionist
trade policies of its member countries in order to promote free trade throughout the EU. It
would not have been necessary to create such a group if these countries had permitted free
trade. It is generally acknowledged that agriculture is one of the most, if not the most, heavily
subsidized and protected industries within many countries of the EU. As a result, complaints
about the alleged dangers posed by U.S. biotechnology products can be a remarkably
convenient pretext for European trade protectionism. However, it by no means follows that
simply because a foreign country has a protectionist economic interest in criticizing a
biotechnology product that there is no basis for the criticism of the product.
14. See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1965 § 112(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1994); Clean Water
Act of 1972 § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994); Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 § 114,42 U.S.C. § 9614 (1994).
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regulation in light of the broad lessons about sustainability learned
from several decades of successful U.S. environmental regulation.
Fitting biotechnology regulation into the context of sustainable

development is an important international goal, both from an
environmental and economic perspective. The significance of this
issue is described in the recent report of the EU-U.S. Consultative

Forum on Biotechnology. 5
15. EU-U.S. Biotechnology Consultative Forum, Final Rep. 7 (Dec. 2000) [hereinafter
Consultative Forum]:
One of the greatest challenges facing today's world is achieving sustainable agriculture
in developed and developing countries. Today the world is not food secure in terms of
access to food. Eight hundred million people are undernourished and 200 million
children under five years of age are underweight. The world's population will increase
by another 1.5 billion within the next 20 years. Improvements in yield on a reliable and
sustainable basis will be needed to meet the demands of the growing population. The
place of biotechnology and other technologies and approaches in today's world should
be seen in this context.
The Consultative Forum endorses public responsibility for global governance of
biotechnology as one contribution to sustainable agriculture. All stakeholders should
take their share of responsibility in being open with citizens and consumers,
establishing transparent and accountable mechanisms for developing accurate
information, sponsoring participatory debate, and striving for comprehensive and
comprehensible regulatory systems.
Conventional agriculture has significant limitations that support the effort to develop
agricultural biotechnology:
With respect to agriculture, agronomists can use genetics to manipulate characteristics
that are commercially important to crop production and the agribusiness industry.
Specifically, agronomists work towards four main objectives. For each crop,
agronomists seek to improve: (1) agronomic suitability of the crop plant to its
environment, (2) quality of the crop produced, (3) yield of the crop produced, and (4)
the resistance of plants to disease and pests.
Historically, the only way to improve qualities of crop plants has been to selectively
breed the plants to enhance the desired characteristics. Cross-breeding different
varieties of self or cross-pollinating plants results in the development of many unique
and genetically diverse landrace varieties, also called cultivated varieties ("cultivars"),
of crop plants that possess the qualities sought by the farmer. Although cross-breeding
is an effective means of improving crop plants on a large scale, it can be incremental,
time-consuming, and imprecise. There is no way to precisely control individual traits,
such as resistance to a certain fungus, without concurrently altering a variety of other
traits. Additionally, cross-pollinating plants do not discriminate as to what other plants
with which they will reproduce. The plants will cross within their variety and across
varieties, and can outcross with wild relatives. While such outcrossing can be seen as
beneficial because it increases diversity of the genetic base, it can result in the
expression of traits unexpected or contrary to the intention of the breeder.
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II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES SUPPORTING SUSTAINABILITY

There is no formal global consensus on environmental principles
or policies necessary to create a sustainable environment. In part, this
results from the U.S.'s refusal to ratify significant international
environmental agreements over the past two decades. These include
the Convention on Biological Diversity, 6 which was an outgrowth of
the Rio de Janeiro Summit; its offshoot, the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety; t 7 and the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change." At the
Consequently, agronomists have turned to biotechnology in seeking a better way to
breed for the expression of specific desired traits.
Saigo, supranote 7, at 782-83 (footnotes omitted).
16. According to Saigo, the U.S.'s refusal to ratify the Convention on Biological Diversity
should have been expected:
[The United States had repeatedly voiced three substantive objections to the
provisions of the Convention. First, the Convention required developed countries to
help fund environmentally sound development in developing countries, without
imposing definite restrictions on the funding power that could be levied against the
developed countries.
Second, the Convention called for essentially open technology transfer-specifically
including transfer of biotechnologies in Article 16, Paragraph 1-between developing
and developed countries. This, when analyzed in conjunction with other related
provisions, disregards patents and other intellectual property rights. Not only does this
provision require transfer of publicly owned technology, but also transfer of
technology that is privately owned, despite the proprietary intellectual property rights
of the owner....
Third, the Convention calls for regulatory measures to be applied to biotechnology that
are not required for other potentially environmentally harmful or diversity reducing
activities. Article 8(g) of the Convention specifically requires nations "to regulate
living modified organisms resulting from biotechnology which are likely to have
adverse environmental impacts that could affect the conservation and sustainable use
of biological diversity, taking also into account the risks to human health." In addition
to the language of Article 8(g), Article 19, paragraph 3 of the Convention states:
The parties shall consider the need for and modalities of a protocol setting out
appropriate procedures, including, in particular, advance informed agreement,
in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of any living modified
organism resulting from biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.
Id. at 802-04 (footnotes omitted).
17. See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Signatures and Ratifications, available at
http:l/www.biodiv.org/biosafety/siginglist.asp (last visited Apr. 4, 2002). The full text of the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety can be found in the Cartagena Protocol to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 5,
1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, available at http://www.biodiv.orgfbiosafety/protocol.asp (last visited
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same time, however, the United States, through its environmental
policies, actually supports, and indeed developed, many of the core
environmental principles embodied in these international
agreements. 9 Thus, although there is no formal consensus for
coordinated, international action on certain issues, in many cases, the

United States subscribes to commonly held environmental policy
principles.
Scientists agree that creation of long term environmental

sustainability entails the creation of a balance, or equilibrium,
between the supply of environmental goods and the demands on the
environment.2" There are a series of basic principles that, while not
rigorously observed in practice, are generally accepted as factors in
regulatory policy decision making in the United States that are
supportive of creating an environmental equilibrium that would lead

to sustainability: sustainable yield; maintenance of biological
diversity; internalization of environmental costs of economic activity
through liability or administrative rules; transparency of policy; and

public participation.
Apr. 4,2002).
18. See Kyoto Protocol: Status of Ratification, available at http.//%wvw.unfccc.de/
resource/kpstats.pdf (last updated Mar. 6, 2002) (ists signatories to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change). The full text of the Kyoto Protocol can be found
in the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
10, 1997, 37 I.h.n. 22, availableat http:l/www.unfccc.de/resource/conv/index.htnl (last visited
Jan. 13, 2001).
19. For example, as early as 1973, the United States demonstrated its commitment to
preservation of biological diversity through enactment of the Endangered Species Act, 16
U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1540 (Supp. 1999). The United States' unwillingness to support many of
these international environmental agreements stems in substantial part from disagreements with
other countries about related issues raised by the agreements, such as proper intellectual
property protection policy, redistributive policy issues, or proper trade policy, as opposed to
disagreement on fundamental environmental protection principles. See, e.g., Saigo, supra note
7, at 811-15.
20. JoHNE. SMITH, BIOTECHNOLOGY 159 (3d ed. 1996):
For any technology to be considered sustainable it must not degrade the environment
through either the overuse of resources or the creation of unbearable ecological
burdens. It is becoming increasingly evident that humankind's activities within the
environment are far exceeding the sustainable capacity of the earth. In essence, the
environmental load equals the size of the world's population [multiplied by] the
prosperity or welfare per head of population [multiplied by] the environmental use per
unit of prosperity (welfare).
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A. Sustainableyield
The United States accepts as a matter of broad national policy that
renewable resources, such as forests and crop land, should be
managed in such a way that they will provide a sustainable, long term
yield even where short term market considerations dictate
otherwise." The United States imposes sustainable yield limitations
on permitted harvests of public renewable resources, such as national
forests.Y For many years, the federal government focused substantial
23
resources on conserving private agricultural resources, such as soil.
In recent years, the federal government has become increasingly
involved in limiting private resource losses through expanded
conservation programs and increased attention to agricultural
pollution.2 4
B. Maintenance ofBiologicalDiversity
The United States accepts, as a matter of national policy, the basic
ecological principle that biological diversity should be maintained if
21. See President's Council on Sustainable Development, Sustainable America: A New
Consensusfor Prosperity,Opportunity,and A HealthyEnvironmentfor the Future (Feb. 1996),
available at http://clinton2.nara.gov/PCSD/Publications/TFReports/amer-chapl.html, which
sets forth "National Goals Toward Sustainable Development," including the following:
GOAL 4: CONSERVATION OF NATURE
Use, conserve, protect, and restore natural resources-land, air, water, and
biodiversity-in ways that help ensure long-term social, economic, and environmental
benefits for ourselves and future generations.
Id.
22. See, e.g., United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Forest Product
Emphasis Areas, available at http://southernregion.fs.fed.us/planning/saa/saprx-10.htim (last
visited Apr. 4, 2002) (describing "Sustained Yield Timber Management" practices utilized by
the Forest Service).
23. See, e.g., J. JEFFREY GOEBEL, THE NATIONAL RESOURCES INVENTORY AND iTs ROLE
INU.S. AGRICULTuRE (1998), available at http://www.statlab.iastate.edu/survey/nri (last visited
Apr. 9, 2002) (providing a historical account of the federal government's efforts to collect
natural resource data since the 1930s).
24. For example, the Conservation Reserve Program, administered by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, offers cost-sharing and incentive payments to farmers who plant
resource-conserving cover on their cropland. See Farm Service Agency Fact Sheet on the
Conservation Reserve Program (Oct. 1999), available at http://www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/
publications/facts/html/crp99.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
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possible, and that government policy should require a searching and
skeptical review of economic or ecological developments that
significantly limit biological diversity.' The United States, for
example, invests billions of dollars per year in the maintenance of
biological diversity through protection and operation of its national
parks, forests, and wildlife refuges, and in restoration projects such as
the Everglades restoration project.26 It also enforces the Endangered
Species Act (ESA)." In situations where the government is required
to approve private action through a permit process, the government is
committed by the ESA to prevent extinction of species absent a truly
compelling justification."
C. Internalizationof Environmental Costs of Economic Activity
Through Liability or AdministrativeRules
The bedrock principle of government policy in regulating
environmental costs in both the United States and Europe is that
'
Liability rules and administrative rules
"polluters should pay."29
25. See supra note 21 (stating the need to develop "measures of threats to habitat loss and
the extent of habitat conversion, such as the rate of wetlands loss, [and to] decrease [ the
number of threatened and endangered species," to reflect how well the United States is
contributing to the protection of natural systems world wide).
26. For example, the Department of the Interior reported spending of $10.3 billion for
fiscal year 2002. See Offices of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States
Government, Fiscal year 2003, Department of the Interior, available at
http:llwww.whitehouse.gov/omblbudgetlfy2003budl7.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2002).
27. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1540 (Supp. 1999).
28. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
29. In the United States, the principle that those whose activities create environmental
externalities should be forced to bear or internalize the full costs of the externalities is generally
accepted. It serves as the policy basis for major federal statutes such as the Superfund Law, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994), and is discussed as a foundation principle of environmental policy
in most introductory environmental law texts. See, e.g., ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAiv AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 37 (2d ed. 1998).

The EU also supports the "polluter pays" principle. European Commission, White Paper on
Environmental Liability, Com 5 (2000). The EU has expressed a similar view on the need to
assign a monetary value to externalities and thus to assist in controlling them. See Position
Paper of the European Consultative Forum on the Env't and Sustainable Dev.: EU sustainable
dev. strategy § 3.3 (Oct. 30, 2000), available at www.europa.eu.int/comm/environment/
forum/agri.htm:
"Externalities" are those environmental and social impacts which are not reflected in
the price of goods and services. There are many ways in which these impacts can be
recognised-for example through strategic environmental assessment or life cycle
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should force the internalization of such social costs in the manner that
lowers transaction costs to the maximum extent possible. There are at
least two critical features of such a regulatory or liability system: (1)
proper identification of the full social costs of an activity; and (2)
choice of efficient methods of requiring internalization of those costs.
The first element of cost internalization is of particular concern where
the social costs of an activity are not obvious or correctly perceived,
while its benefits are. This imbalance between the perception of
actual costs and benefits existed in the early development of the U.S.
chemical industry.30 As a result, chemical pollution of certain kinds
accumulated for some years before its serious adverse effects became
fully apparent, leading ultimately in some cases to a complete U.S.
ban on continued use of the chemicals concerned. 3'
A related issue is that of financial assurance requirements.
Activities that involve unusually large amounts of risk to third parties
or the environment should be conducted only by entities that can
afford to bear the full financial cost of errors in the conduct of those
activities so that society at large is not required to bear such costs.
D. Transparencyof Policy
The United States accepts that the government should make clear
to the public what its policy will be and the basis on which its policy
has been and will be formulated. This responsibility includes a broad
right of citizen access to information obtained by the government
unless that information is subject to explicit statutory protection
against disclosure of, for example, trade secret information.32
assessment. Full account should be taken of hidden or neglected environmental and
social external factors in decision-making at the policy, business and individual levels.
They should be identified, quantified, and when possible given monetary value.
30. See generally RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (Fawcett Crest 1964) (1962); United
States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 607 F. Supp. 1052 (W.D.N.Y. 1985).
31. The use of asbestos, a naturally occurring material, is another example of a situation
where the benefits were obvious long before the major social costs became apparent. The result
has been a social tragedy involving numerous fatalities, severe crippling illnesses, and industrial
bankruptcies, as the U.S. tort liability system began to create a balance between the costs and
benefits of asbestos use years after that use first began.
32. See, e.g., The United States Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
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E. PublicParticipation
A distinctive feature of U.S. environmental law is that it
authorizes substantial public participation in the process of forming
and enforcing regulations for environmental protection.33 Unlike most
other countries in the world, the United States accepts the concept
that members of the public outside of the government should be
given an opportunity to influence public policy through the indirect
mechanism of electoral accountability and also through direct efforts
to influence regulatory policy by public comment and court
challenges to unlawful government action.

Ill. POTENTIAL RISKS OF AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY
To analyze the existing U.S. regulatory system, it is necessary to
consider the risks of agricultural biotechnology that must be
regulated in order to achieve the claimed benefits of the technology.
For purposes of this analysis, the author accepts the fundamental
conclusion of the NRC Report that biotechnology is not "inherently
' However, biotechnology has the potential to create
dangerous." 34
products that may give rise to human health or environmental risks.
In some ways, these health and environmental risks are similar to
those that can be created by conventional agriculture.3 5 According to
33. There are citizen suit provisions in virtually every major federal environmental law
allowing private individuals to directly compel compliance through court action. See, e.g.,
Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994); Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365
(1993); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 7002, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972 (1994);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act § 310, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9659 (1994). A notable exception, pertinent to this article's subject matter, is the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (Supp. 1999).
34. See NRC Report, supra note 1. This conclusion actually appears to be shared by at
least certain elements within the EU. See European Comm'n, White Paper on Environmental
Liability, 17 (Feb. 9, 2000), available at http.//europa.eu.int/conmenviromnment/liability/
white.paper.htm (stating that "activities with respect to genetically modified organisms
(GMOs), are not dangerous per se, but have the potential, in certain circumstances, to cause
damage to health or significant environmental damage").
35. For example, the common goldfish, created by conventional agricultural breeding, is
now one of the most widely dispersed "exotic" species found in the United States, and is
generally regarded as directly responsible for having caused the extinction of several native
American fish species. See Office of Science and Technology Policy, CEQ/OSTP
Assessment: Case Studies of Environmental Regulationfor Biotechnology, Case Study One:
Salmon plus sidebar, at 39, available at http'//www.ostp.gov/htmllO12201.htni (last visited
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the NRC Report, "[T]oxicity, allergenicity, effects of gene flow,
development of resistant pests, and effects on non-target species are
concerns for both conventional and transgenic pest-protected
plants."36
The NRC found that "the Committee is not aware of any evidence
that foods on the market are unsafe to eat as a result of genetic
modification."37 At the same time, however, as discussed below, the
NRC agreed that considerable additional research and regulatory
review should be conducted to assess certain key risks posed by
future pest-protected plants.
In addition, biotechnology has the ability to create risks that
cannot be created by conventional agriculture. Agricultural
biotechnology can introduce into a species novel genetic materials
that cannot be introduced by conventional breeding techniques.38
Moreover, genetically engineered plants and animals may have
characteristics that permit them to be relatively successful in
competing with wild varieties of these plants and animals in the
short-run, but the genetically engineered organism may also lack
certain characteristics of the wild varieties making them more
vulnerable to eventual extinction in the long-run. Theoretically, the
result is that a genetically engineered crop variety could first
extinguish its wild-type competitors and then itself be extinguished.39
Critics of genetically engineered agriculture raise specific risks,
discussed below, that they contend are of major concern. 40
In analyzing these alleged risks, it is important to bear the
following points clearly in mind. First, many of these risks or costs of
agricultural biotechnology are also risks or costs associated with
conventional agricultural practices. Therefore, the agricultural
Mar. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Case Studies], reprinted in ANDERSON ET AL., BIOTECHNOLOGY
DESKBOOK 151 (2001) [hereinafter Deskbook]. Similarly, the National Academy of Sciences
points out that the conventional breeding of potatoes for certain desirable characteristics has in
some cases caused potentially harmful increases in the levels of certain known toxins found in
potatoes. See NRC Report supra note 1, at 70.
36. NRC Report, supra note 1, at 6.
37. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 23-24.
39. See Case Studies, supranote 35, Case Study One at 43; supranote 35, at 155.
40. Most of the following alleged risks are discussed by Holly Saigo. See Saigo, supra
note 7, at 787-96 (footnotes omitted).
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biotechnology regulatory system must compare the marginal costs
associated with agricultural biotechnology with its marginalbenefits.
The proper performance of the agricultural biotechnology regulatory
and liability system depends upon whether it properly compares the
marginal costs of agricultural biotechnology to the marginal benefits
on a life-cycle basis.
Second, the relevant comparison of marginal benefits and costs of
agricultural biotechnology is not simply conventional agricultural
means for producing similar food or feed, but the total social costs
required to sustain such conventional agricultural practices. For
example, if conventional agricultural practices require large amounts
of pesticide use in order to protect their crops, and these pesticides
can be eliminated or sharply reduced by use of biotechnology crops,
then this change would clearly be a marginal benefit of
biotechnology. However, this marginal benefit needs to be weighed
against the cost involved, such as increases in the rate at which crop
pest became resistant to a particular type of genetically engineered
pest control compared to the comparable conventional control.
The objective of agricultural biotechnology regulation should be
to minimize the total social cost of agricultural production, not
simply to limit one aspect of that cost while ignoring increases in cost
in other areas. In short, successful regulation must involve a full,
open accounting for total social life-cycle costs and must permit
analysis of marginal benefits and costs.

IV. ALLEGED MAJOR RISKS OF AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY
A. Migrationof Transgenes into Non-Target Organisms
According to Saigo:
The overarching concern about transgenic plants is that the
engineered genes will migrate or escape into other organisms.
The most likely way for plants to exchange transgenes is
through outcrossing. Outcrossing is the process through which
domesticated plants hybridize with wild relatives, producing a
new variety. Although outcrossing is a common occurrence in
conventional agronomy, outcrossing in transgenic plants may
occur at significantly higher rates. Startlingly, a recent study
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found that genes from transgenic plants might be up to twenty
times more likely to outcross into relative species than the
plant's natural genetic material.4
Other observers of biotechnology, however, suggest that the risk
of such genetic migration is not large:
The possibility of gene transfer to compatible wild relatives
has been given serious examination. Is it possible that
herbicide and pest resistance incorporated into transgenic
plants could find its way into other species and increase their
'weediness'? Under normal conditions gene transfer between
close relatives is a very rare phenomenon and there is little
evidence this will change with transgenic organisms. While
such events are theoretically possible, their occurrence would
be at such a low frequency that in practice the results are of
virtually no consequence or concern.4 2
The NRC Report essentially states that there is insufficient
empirical evidence to make a decision about the seriousness of this
alleged risk of gene migration.43
41. See id. at 787 (footnotes omitted).
42. SMITH, supranote 20, at 215.
43. NRC Report, supranote 1, at 88-89 (emphasis added). The report states:
We know little about the extent to which insects and diseases limit wild, weedy
populations that are sexually compatible with cultivated species. Critics of
biotechnology argue that the spread of beneficial traits could quickly lead to the spread
of weeds; advocates of transgenic crops maintain that this risk is small or nonexistent.
Empiricaldata with which to addressthe question are lacking....
Because of the uncertainties described above, it is premature to predict the ecological
impacts of gene flow from transgenic pest-protected plants. Meanwhile, regulatory
decisions must be made in a timely fashion. It seems unlikely that the transfer of one or
two novel crop genes for pest-protection would transform a wild species into a
problematic weed, although in some cases unwanted population increases of weedy
species could result. Moreover, the cumulative effects of beneficial crop genes could
potentially lead to expensive and ecologically damaging problems in weeds that are
already difficult to control, such as Johnson grass (Sorghum halepense) ....
Consequences ofgeneflow other than weediness are alsoperceived to be detrimental
to preservingbiodiversity. For example, the spread of transgenes to wild relatives that
are rare or endangered is sometimes considered as a potential ecological risk,
especially in regions that are centers of diversity for crop relatives ....
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The considerations noted in the Report led the NRC to
recommend that "[c]riteria for evaluating the merit of
commercializing a new transgenic pest-protected plant should include
whether gene flow to feral plants or wild relatives is likely to have a
significant impact on these populations.'"
This NRC recommendation would constitute a marked change
from current EPA regulatory practice, which apparently disregards
the impact of gene outcrossing to conventionally bred relatives of the
pest-protected plants. According to the EPA's analysis of the
permitting process for MON8 10, a variety of BT-com has:
[t]he potential for outcrossing to traditional cultivars of maize
from MON810 or other registered plant-pesticides is not
currently reviewed within the guidelines (40 CFR). Since the
mammalian toxicity and environmental evaluations have
indicated that the plant-pesticidal substance (i.e., d-endotoxin)
is not a threat to man or the environment, there is not a risk
associated with MON810 pollen fertilizing traditional maize.
Traditional culture methods and breeding (i.e., seed
production) have resulted in cross-pollination between open
pollinated varieties, hybrids and inbred lines for centuries with
no known ill effects. This has similarly transferred genes for
disease and insect resistance between varieties in the past.4'
B. IncreasedCreation ofResistant Weeds and Pests
A well-established limitation of conventional weed and pest
control through herbicides and pesticides is that weeds and pests can
develop effective resistance to them over time.46
44. Id. at 92.
45. See Case Studies, supra note 35, Case Study Two: Bt-Maize plus sidebar, at 21;
Deskbook, supra note 35, at 180; see also discussion of Mexican maize issue, infra notes 15561 and accompanying text.
46. A striking example of this phenomenon is need for rebreeding of the American wheat
crop to protect it from various forms of wheat rust, which are fungi. The fungi develop
resistance within approximately five years, so the wheat crop must be rebred within that period
of time. See NRC Report, supra note 1, at 104-08.
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Although the inheritance of resistance through outcrossing is
not unique to biotechnology, this type of interaction is
arguably more dangerous than that posed by conventional
breeding techniques. Combined with the rapidity with which
transgenes may jump into wild populations and the high levels
of immunity transgenes can confer, the threat of the superweed
is one that cannot be ignored. There are already examples of
herbicide resistant genes that have migrated from transgenic
oilseed rape and sugar beet into wild relatives.47
The NRC acknowledged concerns regarding the possibility of
increased weediness when it found that "transfer of either
conventionally bred or transgenic resistance traits to weedy relatives
potentially could exacerbate weed problems, but such problems have
'
not been observed or adequately studied."48
Both the EPA and the NRC Reports acknowledge concerns about
increased pest-resistance as a result of the use of pest-protected
plants. The EPA imposes restrictions on the planting of certain
genetically modified pest-protected plants (GMPPs) during the
registration process that are specifically designed to limit the increase
in resistance by pests exposed to pest-protected plants.49 The NRC
47. See Saigo, supra note 7, at 789-90 (footnotes omitted).
48. NRC Report, supranote 1, at 9.
49. One article describes this process of EPA restriction with respect to Bt com as
follows:
One of the principal concerns still under study by government, academia, and industry
is the possibility that placing the B.t. protein in the plant where it is expressed at all
times might accelerate the development of resistance to the protein in the pest
population. To date the only documented case of resistance to the protein resulted from
the use of the conventional B.t. sprays. Nevertheless, the EPA has consulted with the
USDA and panels of outside scientific advisors on the resistance issue and has
mandated additional risk mitigation measures for B.t crops to minimize the likelihood
of insect resistance developing to B.t. products, conventional or genetically
engineered. These measures include post-market monitoring for resistance and the
evaluation of new monitoring methods. The majority of these new requirements have
been applied to B.t. com and cotton products and are included in insect resistance
management ("IRM") plans that must be approved by the agency and implemented
under the direction of the registrants.
See Stanley H. Abramson & J. Thomas Carrato, Crop Biotechnology: The Casefor
Product Stewardship, 20 VA. ENVM. L.J. 241, 258 (2001) (internal footnotes
omitted).
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Report recommends further systematic study of this issue because it
concludes that the rate at which such pest resistance will
develop
50
cannot be predicted based on current scientific knowledge.
C. PotentialAdulteration ofFoods by Transgenes
Both in Europe and the United States, there are concerns about the
human health effects of genetically engineered foods. 51 At present,
the United States and Europe both lack monitoring systems to track
such health effects from genetically modified foods or feed. The EU
has proposed regulations, discussed below, to require "traceability,"
which would essentially create a tracking system to permit review of
health effects.52 The United States does not presently require
genetically modified food labeling, crop segregation, or other
measures that could be used to provide tracking capability, since such
53
capability is deemed unnecessary.
According to Saigo: "Studies have shown substantial and
potentially dangerous differences between some of the transgenic
products and their unmodified counterparts. For example, soybeans
modified to contain genes from brazil nuts were found to contain

brazil nut allergens,54posing potential problems for individuals who
are allergic to nuts."
50. See NRC Report, supranote 1,at 9.
51. See, e.g., David Barboza, As Biotech Crops Multiply, Consumers Get Little Choice,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 10, 2001, at 1.
52. See infra Part V.B.
53. For example, the FDA does not require genetically modified food to bear special
labeling, because there is no evidence that such foods "present any different or greater safety
concern than foods developed by traditional plant breeding." Statement of Policy: Foods
Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22984 (May 29, 1992). As a result of the
Starlink M corn regulatory failure, discussed below, the EPA now states that as a matter of
policy it will not permit registration of a genetically modified food source unless it is deemed
safe for both human and animal consumption. In and of itself, this step does not provide GMO
monitoring or tracing capability, however.
54. See Saigo, supra note 7, at 792 (footnotes omitted).
As a result of these laboratory findings, these soybeans were never commercially marketed:
In the mid-1990's the seed company Pioneer Hi-bred dropped plans to commercialize
transgenic soybeans containing a gene from Brazil nuts after research showed that the
soybeans would cause allergic reactions in Brazil nut allergic individuals.
The potential addition of new allergens to foods via genetic engineering is a serious
public health concern. Roughly 2.5 to 5 million Americans suffer from food allergies.
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The NRC acknowledged the legitimacy of concerns about
possible allergenicity, but noted that there is a lack of available direct
scientific methods to test for allergenicity.5 5 The NRC therefore
recommended development of better testing methodologies so that
this issue can be examined before foods are commercialized. 6 The
NRC Report further states that new GMPP cultivars "will need to be
monitored for impacts that could not have been detected in the
laboratory experiments" that reviewed health and safety issues.57 The
NRC acknowledged the need to address concerns regarding toxicity
resulting from pest-protected plants and recommended that long term
toxicity testing may be warranted "[flor some novel pest-protectants
developed for future commercialization."58
D. Non-TargetSpecies Impacts
Over the past year or two, there has been considerable controversy
about the possibility that genetically modified pest-protected plants
could have direct or indirect unintended harmful consequences on
Although reactions in many individuals are limited to unpleasant symptoms such as
gastrointestinal distress or skin rashes, allergic reactions in some individuals can cause
anaphylactic shock and death.
Unfortunately, there is currently no predictive methodology for testing the
allergenicity of most proteins introduced to foods via genetic engineering. Testing is
only possible for proteins from commonly allergenic foods such as nuts. Blood serum
is available from individuals with common food allergies, thus allowing proteins from
commonly allergenic foods to be screened for "antibody-antigen" reactions. However,
for most proteins, including those from foods that are not commonly allergenic and
those from non-food sources such as bacteria, no such testing is possible. In other
words, most proteins added to foods via genetic engineering cannot be tested for
allergenicity.
Testimony of Rebecca J.Goldburg, Ph.D., Senior Staff Scientist, Environmental Defense Fund
and Member, National Research Council Committee on Genetically Modified Pest-Protected
Plants, before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Science,
Subcommittee on Basic Research, at 3 (Oct. 5, 1999), available at http://www.house.gov/
sciencelgoldburg_100599.htm.
55. See NRC Report, supra note 1, at 7.
56. Id. at 7.
57. Id.at96.
58. Id.at8:
The EPA should provide clear, scientifically justifiable criteria for establishing
biochemical and functional equivalency when registrants request permission to test
non plant-expressed proteins in lieu of expressed proteins.

2002]

Regulating Environmentalists

non-target organisms. For example, there is disagreement over
studies showing that Bt-corn toxins can kill monarch butterflies,
59
which often feed on milkweed found in and around cornfields.
Industry acknowledges that Bt-corn toxins can harm monarch
butterflies, which are from a family similar to the family that the
toxins are in fact designed to kill.60 Industry supporters, however,
argue that very little corn pollen lands on milkweed leaves, and
therefore monarch larvae would only be exposed to pollen in
concentrations too small to harm them.6'
The NRC clearly believed that the risk of impacts on non-target
organisms is a risk worth careful consideration in the regulatory
process. For example, the NRC Report notes: "If a pest-protected
plant causes dramatic decreases in some herbivore or omnivore
populations, there will be less nutrient material for the next level in
the food chain. It is theoretically possible that a specialized predator,
parasite, or pathogen of an affected herbivore could become locally
' 62
extinct.
The EPA's registration of MON810 and other Bt-corn varieties,
has now become controversial.63 Environmentalists believe that
during registration, the EPA did not require sufficient analysis of the
impact of Bt-corn plants that produced lepidopteran toxins on nontarget species, such as the monarch butterfly. 64 Environmentalists
note that there are approximately nineteen non-target butterfly and
moth species that are either threatened or endangered and feed in or
near Bt cornfields. 65 The NRC Report agrees that impacts on
nontarget lepidopterans are likely at least where CrylA Bt toxins are
concerned.66
The NRC Report points out, however, that the impact of pest
protected plant toxins on non-target species needs to be compared to
59. See Deskbook, supranote 35, at 13.
60. See, e.g., Biotechnology Industry Organization, Backgrounder on Monarch Butterflies
at Bt. Crops, availableat http://www.bio.org/food&ag/monarch.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2002).
61. Id.
62. NRC Report, supranote 1, at 72.
63. Id. at 75.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id..
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the impact of pesticides. There might be a net biodiversity benefit
resulting from the use of the pest-protected plants. The NRC Report
finds that both pest-protected and conventional crops "could have
effects on nontarget species, but these potential impacts on nontarget
organisms are generally expected to be smaller than the impacts of
broad spectrum synthetic insecticides, and therefore, the use of pestprotected plants could lead to greater biodiversity in agroecosystems
where they replace the use of those insecticides." 67
The NRC went on to recommend that "[c]riteria for evaluating the
merit of commercializing a new transgenic pest-protected plant
should include the anticipated impacts on nontarget organisms
compared with those of currently used pest control techniques."68
E. Crop Plants andBiodiversity Effects
Both conventional agricultural plant breeding practice and
genetically engineered plants share the risk of biodiversity loss.
Biodiversity is important not as an end in itself, but rather as a
protection against possible vulnerability of part of an overall
ecosystem to attack by predators. The more prominent a single
variety of a crop plant becomes, for example, the more susceptible
the agricultural system is to large scale failure in the event that the
prominent variety comes under attack by a pest resistant to control or
a new disease.69 Whether this risk is larger in the case of genetically
engineered crops than in the case of conventional agriculture is
difficult to assess. In either case, the prominence of a crop variety is
probably largely a matter of the perceived relative economics of
planting than crop variety at a given time. In other words, the more
economic savings there appear to be from producing a given crop
variety, the more likely it is that the less costly crop variety will be
planted. It is important, in short, that the market be given proper
signals by regulators so that there is no artificial bias in favor of a
particular crop variety, whether produced by conventional crop
67. Id. at 80 (emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. Saigo gives two prominent examples of large scale crop failures that resulted from a
lack of genetic diversity flowing from conventional crossbreeding: the Irish potato famine and
the Southern corn blight in the early 1970s. See Saigo, supra note 7, at 795-96.
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breeding or genetic engineering. To the extent that market failure
concerns may, insome cases, require regulations for sustainable yield
and biodiversity protection, such concerns would apply equally to
agricultural biotechnology and conventional agriculture.
The NRC acknowledged the need for long term environmental
monitoring of pest-protected crops. In one of its recommendations,
the NRC noted the need to "[m]onitor ecological impacts of pestprotected crops on a long term basis to ensure the detection of
impacts that may not be predicted from tests conducted during the
regulatory approval process."7'
V. EXISTING AND PROPOSED REGULATION OF AGRICULTURAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN UNITED STATES AND EUROPE

A. UnitedStates
The existing regulation of agricultural biotechnology in the United
States is based on the 1986 Coordinated Framework for the
Regulation of Biotechnology (Coordinated Framework), created by
presidential authority based on existing legislation." The Coordinated
Framework divided biotechnology regulatory authority between three
regulatory agencies: the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the EPA.72 The idea
was that each agency would regulate those biotechnology products
that corresponded to the conventional products subject to regulation
under that agency's existing legal authorities. Over the subsequent
ten years, these agencies established policies to guide their use of
legislative authorities under which they regulated various aspects of
biotechnology.73 During this same period, Congress did not approve
any legislation specifically altering biotechnology regulation, and
none has received Administration support. 74
70. NRC Report, supra note 1, at 10 (emphasis omitted).
71. Id.atlO-11.
72. Id. at 11.

73. Id.
74. There were amendments during that period to some of the prior regulatory statutes
under which the agencies now also regulate biotechnology products. For example, the EPA's

7 U.S.C.
pesticide regulatory authorities were modernized by congressional action. See, e.g.,
§ 136(66) (Supp. 1999) (Defining "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment" to include
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In theory, the Coordinated Framework should have provided for
comprehensive review of agricultural biotechnology. However,
although there was a division of jurisdiction within the framework,
control over transgenic pest-protected plants was not addressed by
the original framework document. 75 Perhaps it did not occur to
regulators who claimed they created a comprehensive framework for
biotechnology regulation that within a few years' creation of such
plants would either be possible or desirable. Although the EPA
proposed a rule to cover pesticidal substances in pest-protected plants
in 1994, this rule is not yet finalized.76 In recognition of this
unfortunate state of affairs, the NRC concluded that "there is an
urgency to complete the regulatory framework for transgenic plant
products because of the potential diversity of novel traits that could
of
be introduced by transgenic methods and because of the rapid rate
77
adoption of and public controversy regarding transgenic crops.
1. USDA Regulation for Plant Protection
The USDA is responsible for regulating plants, including
genetically altered organisms, under the Plant Protection Act (PPA)
which gives the USDA the authority to:
prohibit or restrict the importation, entry, exportation, or
movement in interstate commerce of any plant, plant product,
biological control organism... if the Secretary determines that
the prohibition or restriction is necessary to prevent the
introduction into the United States or the dissemination of a
plant pest or noxious weed within the United States.78
The USDA exercises this authority under a permit system run by
the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). APHIS
issues field test permits for new plants that have the potential to
human dietary risks from pesticide residues on foods, for purposes of pesticide registration
under FIFRA.). Some consideration was given during the Clinton Administration to possible
new systematic biotechnology legislation, but none was ever proposed. See, e.g., William Y.
Brown, Promise and Peril, The Environmental Forum, 38 (Sept.-Oct. 2001).
75. See NRC Report, supranote 1, at 145.
76. Seesupranote 3.
77. NRCReport, supranote 1, at 11.
78. Deskbook, supra note 35, at 15 (quoting 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7772) (2000)).
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create pest problems in domestic agriculture, which could include
articles developed through biotechnology.79
The APHIS permitting process applies to "regulated articles,"
defined as "any organism which has been altered or produced through
genetic engineering," if the donor organism belongs to certain genera
or taxa and meets the definition of a "plant pest. 8 .. "Plant pest" is
broadly defined, encompassing "direct or indirect injury, disease, or
damage not just to agricultural crops, but also to plants in general, for
example, native species, as well as to organisms that may be
beneficial to plants, for example, honeybees."8
APHIS permits control the "introduction" of a regulated article,
which includes importation, interstate movement, or release into the
environment.82 Therefore, the permitting scheme applies only
when a person seeks to introduce genetically engineered
organisms into the environment or interstate commerce. A
typical permit will cover small-scale field testing of a
genetically engineered plant prior to commercialization. While
APHIS automatically requires a permit if the donor or recipient
organism is a known plant pest, it reserves the right to require
a permit for a product it has "reason to believe" is a plant
pest.83
Thus, USDA regulatory review of agricultural biotechnology is
limited to whether the proposed biotechnology application involves
the creation of a "plant pest" which will be released into the
79. Seeid.at17.
80. See id. "Regulated article status has been applied to most of the genetically modified
plants that have been developed to date." Id.

81. Seeid. at 15.
82. Seeid. at 17.
83. Abramson & Carrato, supranote 49, at 247-48 (internal footnotes omitted). Abramson

and Carrato note:
APHIS has issued some 932 permits for genetically engineered organisms since the
program began in 1987, primarily for small-scale field tests involving crop plants.
Based on its experience with the permit program, APHIS has provided a number of
exemptions for articles which do not pose a plant pest risk. One of the more significant
exemptions authorizes the introduction of certain regulated articles without a permit,
provided that APHIS is notified in advance.
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environment. If no "plant pest" is involved, then the USDA's
regulatory review is complete. The NRC Report notes that the narrow
scope of USDA's regulations may prevent the agency from
regulating some genetically engineered crops that it wishes to
regulate.84 The USDA does not actually consider in its regulatory
review process many of the potential biotechnology risks discussed
above that may adversely affect agriculture.
2. FDA Regulation for Food Safety
Food safety is regulated by the FDA under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA)" The FFDCA defines "food" as:
"(1) articles used for food or drink for man or other animals, (2)
chewing gum, and (3) articles used for components of any such
article."8 6 FDA approval is not required prior to marketing a food, but
there are prohibitions against misbranding or adulterating food.87
Genetically modified food could fall under the FDA's pre-market
approval authority if it is considered adulterated, based, for example,
on a finding that the modification is an "unsafe food additive."88
Similarly, genetically modified food could be found to be
"misbranded" if the food is not described on its label by "a common
or usual name."89
A food additive may include "any substance the intended use of
which results or may reasonably be expected to result, directly or
indirectly, in its becoming a component ... of any food . ...""
However, certain substances are not considered food additives
because they are "GRAS," or "generally recognized, among experts
qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate [their]
safety as having been adequately shown .. .to be safe under the
conditions of its intended use."'"
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See NRC Report, supra note 1, at 161.
21 U.S.C. § 301 (1997).
See Deskbook, supranote 35, at 25 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 321(0 (Supp. 1998)).
See 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1997).
See Deskbook, supranote 35, at 25.
See id. at 26.
Id.
Id. at27.
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The FDA does not regulate biotechnology foods differently than
those produced through conventional breeding and does not require
pre-market approval or special labeling of such foods. In 1992, the
FDA published a policy statement for foods derived from new plant

varieties, which states that FDA may use its authority over food
additives, under FFDCA section 409, to require pre-market approval
where necessary to protect public health.93 Although genetic material
transferred to plants through biotechnology is "presumed to be
GRAS," and hence not normally regulated as a food additive, an
"expression product," or substance introduced into food because of
the genetic engineering such as carbohydrates, fats, and oils, may be
regulated as a food additive.94
One key result of the FDA's 1992 policy is that manufacturers of
genetically modified foods are not required to label those foods as
genetically modified because the FDA does not regard them as less
safe than conventionally produced foods.95 Another result is that
developers of biotechnology foods are not required to consult the
FDA prior to marketing their products, although they are encouraged
to do S0.96 In January 2001, the FDA proposed regulations, discussed
92. See id.
93. See Abramson & Carrato, supranote 49, at 251.
94. See id. at 251-52.
95. See Cliff D. Weston, Chilling Of The Corn:Agricultural BiotechnologyIn The Face
of U.S. Patent Law And The CartagenaProtocol,4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 377, 407
(2000) (footnotes omitted):
Proponents [of GMO labeling] argue that the information should be made available to
give the consumer the choice of purchasing GMO or traditional products. They assert
that agricultural biotech companies should have no objections to labeling since the
industry claims the products are safe. Critics of the plan respond that much of the
resistance to GMOs has been based on hype and unreasonableness rather than
objective science. They claim that labeling would amount to placing a "skull and
crossbones" on the products and that labeling is unnecessary under the FDA
guidelines.
96. See Abrarmson & Carrato, supra note 49, at 252-53. However, although consultation is
not mandated:
[a]s a practical matter, companies developing new biotechnology food products have
routinely consulted with FDA scientists as an integral part of their product stewardship
programs. Through calendar year 2000, the FDA has conducted 49 final consultations
under its 1992 policy .... A letter from the FDA acknowledging completion of the
consultation process is evidence of a final consultation. The letter provides assurance
to potential customers that the product has been reviewed by federal food safety
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below, that would require premarket notification to the FDA before
introduction of genetically modified foods.97
3. EPA Regulation of Pesticides
The EPA has statutory authority to regulate the manufacture,
importation, sale, and use of pesticides under the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).98 The EPA further
regulates pesticides under the FFDCA, which requires that the EPA
establish a tolerance for pesticides used for food or animal feed.99
Under FIFRA, any pesticide, which is "any substance or mixture
which is intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating
a pest... ." sold or used in the United States, must be registered with
the EPA.' The intended use of a product governs whether it is a
pesticide and intent is present where "(a) the seller claims, states or
implies that a substance can be used as a pesticide; (b) the substance
has no other commercially valuable use except as a pesticide; or (c)
the seller has actual or constructive knowledge that the substance will
or is intended to be used as a pesticide."'' Sale or distribution of a
pesticide is prohibited without EPA registration, which will be
granted where the pesticide is effective, the labeling meets certain
statutory requirements under FIFRA, and the expected use will not
cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.0 2
Any substance that is a pesticide under FIFRA and is used on food
or feed crops is subject to regulation under the FFDCA, and the EPA
officials and also demonstrates that the developer has met the prevailing "standard of
care" for such products.
Id.
97. See Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706 (Jan. 18,
2001); see also Abramson & Carrato, supra note 49, at 252-53.
98. See Deskbook, supranote 35, at 33.
99. See id. (stating that a "tolerance" is the "maximum level of pesticide residue that may
be present in food or animal feed").
100. See id. (defining a "pest" as "any insect, rodent, nematode, fungus, weed, or any other
form of terrestrial or aquatic plant or animal life or virus, bacteria, or other microorganism,
except microorganisms on or in living man or other living animals").
101. Seeid.
102. See idat 34.
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must establish a tolerance for the pesticide. 3 The EPA may register a
pesticide for use on food or animal feed for these three reasons: if any
residue will fall within the established tolerance; if the EPA grants an
exemption from the tolerance requirement; or, if the pesticide is
GRAS." ° The EPA may exempt a pesticide from FIFRA
requirements if the pesticide is adequately regulated by another
agency or if the EPA determines that the pesticide poses "no
unreasonable risk."'0 5
In 1994, the Biopesticides and Pollution Prevention Division was
established within the EPA's Office of Pesticides and Prevention and
is responsible for registering "biopesticides," which are derived from
natural materials such as plants, animals, or microorganisms."' The
EPA extended its FIFRA authority to genetically engineered
pesticides and regulates them as "plant pesticides," defined as "a
pesticidal substance that is produced in a living plant and the genetic
materials necessary for [its] production... where... intended for
1 7 As discussed above, the EPA
use in the living plant.""
issued a final
rule on July 19, 2001 that generally outlines its approach to plant
pesticides (PIPs), but does not address all outstanding issues
regarding substances that will be exempted from the FIFRA
requirements.
B. Trends in EuropeanRegulation
European regulation consists of EU regulations and directives, but
can also be considered to include international agreements to which
the EU subscribes, such as the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol, and EU
liability rules governing agricultural biotechnology. This section
sketches out recent EU regulatory proposals as a basis for comparison
with the U.S. regulatory system.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at35.
Seeid.at36.
See id.
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1. Tracing/Labeling/Premarket Reviews
The European Community proposed genetically modified
organisms (GMOs) premarket review and tracing regulations. The
proposed tracing regulations are described generally by the European
Commission as follows: 108
[T]he [regulations will provide the] ability to trace GMOs and
products produced from GMOs at all stages of the placing on
the market throughout the production and distribution chains
facilitating quality control and also the possibility to withdraw
products. Importantly, effective traceability provides a 'safety
net' should any unforeseen adverse effects be established. The
retroactive tracking of the movement of GMOs and products
produced from GMOs through the production and distribution
chains will be facilitated by traceability requirements based on
transmission and retention of relevant information for such
products, at all stages of their placing on the market. 9

108. See Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council Concerning Traceability and Labelling of Genetically
Modified Organisms and Traceability of Food and Feed Products Produced From Genetically
Modified Organisms and Amending Directive, 2001/18/EC, 2-3 (July 25,2001).
109. Id. at 2-3. According to the Commission,
such a traceability "system" limits discontinuity of product specific information
through the chains and thereby facilitates:
" withdrawal of products should an unforeseen risk to human health or the
environment be established;
o

targeted monitoring of potential effects on human health or the environment,
where appropriate;

o

control and verification of labelling claims.

Id. According to the report of the U.S.-European Union Consultative Forum:
Effective monitoring requires the ability to trace the presence of genetically modified
products. At the present time, no obvious health effects have yet been identified with
crops or foods that have been approved. Anticipated effects are likely to be of lowlevel, evident only after long periods of use among especially at risk population
groups, difficult to detect with certainty and thus, monitoring for such effects is likely
to be costly to implement. However, the capacity to trace these products is essential to
ensuring consumer choice, understanding the causes and establishing liability in cases
of unanticipated negative effects, ensuring effective product recall should a safety
problem arise, and, in some cases, validating benefit claims.
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The traceability regulations would impose a series of requirements
on participants in various stages of the food production and
distribution process for information transfer and recordkeeping on
GMOs designed to make it possible, among other things, to institute a
recall of genetically modified food in the event human health
concerns necessitated a recall.1 1 The United States has no
comparable regulations.
The European Commission (EC) also recently proposed new
European regulations on labeling and safety review of genetically
modified food and feed."' These regulations would require
mandatory premarket safety review of genetically modified food and
feed, and authorize new, broader GMO labeling requirements for
such products. The United States has no comparable requirements.
2. Cartagena Biosafety Protocol
The Cartagena Biosafety Protocol, to which the EU subscribes,

contains a number of key provisions, including provisions requiring
2
labeling of GMO food and feed, and the "precautionary principle.""1

Consultative Forum, supranote 15, at 12.
110. See Commission on the European Communities, supranote 109, at 2-3.
Ill. Seeid.
112. Weston describes the precautionary principle provision and the issues it raises as
follows.
The Protocol declares that:
[L]ack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and
knowledge . . . shall not prevent [a subscribing country] from taking a decision
regarding GMO imports. This provision permits countries to apply the precautionary
principle in addressing GM imports. The principle permits a country to take action to
protect itself-by barring import of a genetically modified organism--even if there is
a lack of scientific certainty it would be dangerous. The immediate concern for the
U.S. biotech industry is that this principle will allow Europe and other nations to
improperly implement isolationist or protectionist policies to aid their domestic
industries. The determination of the level of insufficiency of scientific evidence is
placed in the hands of those contemplating GM product bans rather than in an
impartial body. Having to present evidence of absolute safety is an insurmountable
burden; the question of how far below that threshold scientific certainty may fall
before becoming insufficient is left to officials balancing civic duties with the need to
appease their constituencies. A nation desirous of domestic industrial or agricultural
protection, a goal generally not permitted by the General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs (GATT), may now undertake such protection under the auspices of the
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3. EC White Paper on Environmental Liability
In early 2000, after lengthy deliberations, the EC developed a
White Paper on Environmental Liability (White Paper) that will serve
as the basis for European Community regulations on environmental

liability to be developed over the next several years.'

3

The White

Paper recognizes that, under the EC Treaty, European Community
policy on the environment "shall contribute to pursuit (among other
things) of the objective of protecting human health." 114

The EC outlines in its White Paper the goals for an EU
environmental liability regime generally and as applied to
biotechnology." 5 The EU's White Paper comes to the same
fundamental conclusion reached by U.S. regulatory authorities, that
GMO activities are not inherently dangerous, but they do have the
Protocol. It invites nations to overweigh concerns based on public opinion in order to
declare the perceived risks too great to be assuaged by the available scientific findings.
Weston, supra note 95, at 405.
113. European Comm'n, White Paper on Environmental Liability (Feb. 9, 2000)
[hereinafter EU White Paper].
114. Id.§4.2.1.
115. Id. § 4.2.2 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added):
The objective of nearly all national environmental liability regimes is to cover
activities that bear an inherent risk of causing damage. Many of such activities are
currently regulated by Community environmental legislation, or Community
legislation that has an environmental objective along with other objectives. A coherent
framework for the liability regime needs to be linked with the relevant EC legislation
on protection of the environment. In addition to ensuring restoration of the
environment where this is currently not possible, the liability regime would therefore
also provide... legislation in the field of biotechnology; and legislation in the field of
transport of dangerous substances. In the further shaping of an EC initiative, the scope
of activities will need to be defined with more precision, for instance by setting up a
list of all the pieces of relevant EC legislation with which the liability regime should
be linked. Moreover, some of these activities, such as activities with respect to
genetically modified organisms (GMOs), are not dangerous per se, but have the
potential, in certain circumstances, to cause damage to health or signiicant
environmental damage. This could be the case,for example, in the event of an escape
from a high-level containment facility or from unforeseen results of a deliberate
release.For this reason, it is consideredappropriatefor such activitiesto come within
the scope of a Community-wide liability regime. In these cases, the precise definition
of the regime,for instance the defences to be allowed, might not be the samefor all
activities relatedto GMOs, but may have to be differentiated accordingto the relevant
legislation and the activities concerned.
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116
potential in some cases to cause health or environmental damage.
The White Paper apparently proposes to include GMO related
activities within the general ambit of the strict liability regime it
envisions for environmental harms."' Although the White Paper does
not provide specific details on this point, it appears to suggest that
some GMO-related activities would be subject to strict tort liability
for damage caused by the activity, while other activities might be
permitted defenses, relating, perhaps, to the social utility of the
activities concerned."18
The European Community's proposed agricultural biotechnology
regulations represent a much different, and apparently far more
interventionist, approach to regulation of agricultural biotechnology
than that adopted by the United States. It is too soon, for two reasons,
to predict to what extent the tort liability system to be adopted for
agricultural biotechnology in the EU will resemble that in the United
States. First, the ultimate nature of the EU system is unclear. Second,
as discussed below, the U.S. tort liability system is still in flux as far
as agricultural biotechnology is concerned.

VI. AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY REGULATORY FAILURES
Despite the supposed comprehensiveness and quality of the
Coordinated Framework, there were a series of regulatory failures
involving agricultural biotechnology over the past several years.
These failures raise questions about the quality and reliability of the
U.S. agricultural biotechnology regulatory system.
A. StarLink Tm Case Study
One genetically modified product that received attention both in
the United States and abroad is StarLinkTm corn, a type of corn
genetically engineered to produce a pesticide to kill the European
corn borer, a destructive pest."' As explained before, pesticides,
116. Id.
117. Id. § 4.2.2.
118. Id. §§ 4.2-4.3.
119. The European corn borer is "the most damaging insect pest of corn throughout the
United States and Canada," responsible for over $1 billion in crop losses and control costs each
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including those substances inserted directly into the subject plant
through genetic engineering which produce an insecticide within the
plant, must be registered with EPA under FIFRA."20
year. KIR. Ostlie et al., eds., Bt Corn & European Corn Borer: Long-Term Success Through
Resistance Management (1997), available at http://www.extension.umn.edu/distribution/
cropsystems/DC7055.html#chl (last visited Jan. 3, 2002). To combat the pest, scientists have
transferred genetic material from Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), a naturally occurring soilborne
microorganism, into food crops. The Bt gene produces crystal-like proteins (Cry proteins that
are d-endotoxins) that kill specific groups of insects by binding to the intestinal lining of insects
that eat the proteins, and rupturing intestinal cells. See id.
120. On May 5, 1995, the EPA granted the first registration for this type of "plantincorporated protectant" for the NewLeaf A3 potato, another form of Bt crop. See Abramson &
Carrato, supra note 49, at 256. In registering the Bt protein for this use, the EPA found "that it
was nontoxic to mammals, birds, and most other insects, and would reduce the need for
conventional pesticides." See id.
The review process for the NewLeaf A3 potato lasted five years, from 1991-1995, and
included the following measures:
The potato was initially field tested in small-scale plots under a permit granted by the
USDA, followed by testing on a larger scale under an experimental use permit from
the EPA. Subsequently, the USDA reviewed data submitted by the developer and
determined that the modified potato was not a plant pest and, therefore, was not
considered a regulated article under the plant pest regulations. The potato's developer
then completed the consultation process with the FDA, having submitted information
confirming that, other than the presence of the B.t. protein, the NewLeafrM potato
was not significantly different from any other Russet Burbank potato. These actions
cleared the way for the review of health, safety, and environmental data and the
eventual approval'of applications for commercialization by the EPA. In addition to
obtaining a registration of the B.t. protein as expressed in the potato under FIFRA, the
applicant was also required to petition the EPA for a tolerance exemption for potential
trace levels of the B.t. protein under the FFDCA.
See id. According to Abramson and Carrato, "Technology companies have estimated that the
combined cost to develop the (Bt) products, conduct the appropriate scientific studies, and
obtain the necessary clearances for the current B.t. crops exceeded $3 billion." See id.
The registrations for Bt crops are conditioned on the producers' acceptance of specific
conditions, and the EPA has in some cases "persuaded registrants to accept additional
conditions years after the original product approval action." See id. For example, the
registrations for Bt corn and cotton were subject to an "ongoing reassessment" through the year
2001, at which point the EPA had the option of whether to extend the registrations, or allow
them to terminate. In October, 2001, the EPA extended the registrations for both Bt cotton and
coin. For cotton, the EPA found the protein expressed in the genetically modified seeds,
CrylAc, does not "significantly increase the risk of unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment" and that use of Bt cotton would not pose risks to human health or to non-target
species. See The EPA Biopesticides Registration Action Document, Bt Plant-Incorporated
Protectants at IV 4 (Sept. 29, 2001), available at http:llwww.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/
otherdocs/btbrad2/6%20cotton.pdf. However, because CrylAc raises concers with respect to
the risk of gene flow and insect resistance management, EPA conditioned the registration on
specific terms and conditions.
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StarLink Tm corn was initially registered with the EPA in May
1998.121 The registration was limited to animal feed or industrial use
with a maximum 120,000 acres."2 The EPA did not approve the corn
for human consumption based on concerns that a protein contained in
StarLinkTm corn, known as Cry9C, may be a human allergen."
However, the EPA approved the corn for animal consumption, based
on the EPA's determination that the effect of any residual Cry9C in
animal products would not be harmful to humans.124 When
StarLinkTm was re-registered in 1999, "2the restrictions limiting it to
The registration for Bt corn containing CrylAb or CrylF proteins was also extended,
subject to specific terms and conditions. See id. The EPA concluded that CrylAb and CrylF,
the proteins found in the corn products at issue, have significant economic benefits, result in
"less human and environmental risk than chemical alternatives," and would not pose risks to
human health or to non-target species. See id.
121. EPA Office of Pesticide Programs, Biopesticide Fact Sheet: Bacillus thuringiensis
subspecies tolworthi Cry9C Protein and the Genetic Material Necessary for Its Production in
Corn, Section A (Mar. 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/pesticideslbiopesticides!
factsheets/fs006466t.htm (last visited Dec. 30,2001).
122. See id.
123. The EPA was unable to determine that there was a "reasonable certainty of no harm"
from use of StarLinkTm corn in human food, because of the risk that Cry9C could be allergenic:
The Agency's assessment of Cry9C revealed that it has particular characteristics in
common with known allergens: it is relatively heat stable and does not readily break
down in simulated digestive fluids. This raises the possibility that it could be a human
allergen. However, EPA determined that, notwithstanding its concern with respect to
human ingestion of Cry9C, Cry9C was "safe" and when used as animal feed would not
present unreasonable risks to human health. Because the protein does not transfer to
meat and poultry products, use in animal feed would not result in human dietary
exposure to the protein/potential allergen.
Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4,825,4,826 (Jan. 18,2001).
124. The EPA stated:
Based on the toxicology data cited and the limited exposure expected with animal feed
use, there is reasonable certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure to
the U.S. population, including infants and children, to residues of... Cry9C protein
and the genetic material necessary for its production in com. This includes all
anticipated dietary exposures and all other exposures for which there is reliable
information. The Agency has arrived at this conclusion because, as discussed above,
the temporary toleranceexemption is limited tofeed use only.
Bacillus Thuringiensis Subspecies Tolworthi Cry9C Protein and Genetic Material Necessary for
Production in Corn, 63 Fed. Reg. 28,260 (May 22, 1998) (emphasis added).
125. The registration was transferred to AgrEvo USA Company, and then to Aventis Crop
Science USA LP. "On October 29, 1998, the StarLinkTM corn registration was conveyed from
Plant Genetic Systems (America) to AgrEvo USA. AgrEvo USA and Rhone Poulenc Ag
Company subsequently formed Aventis CropScience USA LP (Aventis). As of February 22,
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domestic animal and industrial use only and the 660 foot buffer zone
remained the same, but the total allowable acreage was increased to
2.5 million acres.' 26 The registration, which expired May 30, 2000,
imposed a condition requiring the then registrant, Aventis, to ensure
that all growers signed an agreement to abide by the restrictions set
forth in the registration.' 27
The EPA registration outlined precise language that was to be
used in the directions accompanying the product.128 It appears that, at
some time, Aventis prepared a form, entitled "StarLink Tm Bt Grower
Agreement," that listed restrictions on the use of StarLink mT corn, but
2000, the StarLinkTM corn registration is now held by Aventis under registration number 264669." See Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4825 (Jan. 18,
2001).
126. See EPA Office of Pesticide Programs, supranote 122, at Section B.
127. See id.
128. See Neil E. Harl et al., The StarLink Tm Situation,at 2-4 (July 30, 2001), available at
http://www.exnet.iastate.edu/Pages/grain/publicationsbuspub/0100star.pdf (last visited Jan. 5,
2002) (emphasis added):
DIRECTIONS FOR USE
It is a violation of Federal Law to use this product in a manner inconsistent with its
labeling. Keep out of lakes, ponds or streams. Do not contaminate water by cleaning of
equipment or disposal of wastes. All field corn containing the plant-pesticide that is
sold or distributed by Aventis CropScience USA LP or a cooperator or licensee of
Aventis, must be accompanied by informational material that contains the following:

Feed or Non-food Industrial Uses: Seeds expressing the Cry9C protein should be
planted at a maximum of 40,000 seeds per acre on the site. Any seeds, plants or plant
materials in the StarLinkTm . field, or within 660 feet of the field, should be used
domestically for animal feed or non-food industrial purposes. None of the seeds, plants
or plant materials in the StarLinkanY plot, or within 660 feet of the field, may be used
for food uses or may enter international commerce.
STORAGE AND DISPOSAL
Seed Storage: Store in a cool dry place separate from conventional corn seed.
Seed and Plant Disposal: Any seeds, plants or plant materials in the StarLinkTM field,
or within 660 feet of the field, may be used domestically for animal feed or industrial
purposes, or destroyed. None of the seeds, plants or plant materials in the
StarLinkrmfield, or within 660feet of thefield, may be usedforfood uses or may enter
internationalcommerce....
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"not all producers were asked to or did sign the agreement."' 2 9 It is
not clear whether growers actually received the warning required by
EPA as a condition of registration. 3 ' However, it is undeniable that,
T
even if growers were adequately warned, StarLink m
corn did enter
the human consumption food channels. This entry caused a
significant disruption in the corn market, and some consumers
alleged resulting personal injury.
The presence of StarLinkmT corn in human food was initially
discovered in September, 2000 by the environmental group Friends
of the Earth.' The group hired an independent laboratory to test
Kraft taco shells, which were found to contain traces of StarLink Tm
corn. 132 Immediately after the release of the test results, the FDA
129. The agreement states in part:
In accepting StarLink M corn, Grower agrees to direct the harvested grain and grain
grown within 660 feet of the StarLink M grain towards domestic feed (e.g. animal feed)
and/or non-food industrial purposes. Grower agreesnot to use this grainforfood use
or allow it to enter grain export channels. Grower further agrees to either feed the
grain obtained from StarLinkTM corn hybrids on-farm or sell it for domestic (animal)
feed, industrial or non-food uses only. Possible domestic off-farm use of the grain
includes selling it to feed mills, neighbors with livestock operations or elevators that
supply U.S. livestock feed operations. Aventis CropScience will provide Grower with
a list of elevators or grain buyers that can provide this type of usage, prior to planting
and/or prior to harvest.
See id. at 5 (emphasis added).
130. As one author observed:
Essentially, Aventis depended on a game of telephone to keep StarLink from getting
misdirected into the human components of the agricultural machine.
For the plan to work, information about StarLink would be passed from Aventis to the
seed companies; then the seed companies would communicate it to its dealers, who
would in turn tell farmers who bought StarLink.
Sometimes, the message got through. Jeff Lacina, a spokesman for the Garst Seed Co.,
said it informed all 3,500 of its dealers about the rules governing StarLink. And
Sharon Greif, a Garst dealer in Linn County, Iowa, said she received that information
and would have passed it to any customers who purchased the seed.
But in many other cases, the message about StarLink did not get through.
See The Associated Press, StarLink corn: How it reached the food supply (Dec. 4, 2000),
available at http:llarchive.showmenews.com!2000/dec/20001204busiO1 l.asp.
131. See National Environmental Trust, Genetically Engineered Corn Not Approved for
Human consumption Found in Taco bell Brand Taco Shells [sic] (Sept. 18, 2000), at
http:/vww.biotech-info.net/taco-bell.html.
132. See id.
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began receiving reports from consumers alleging that they
experienced adverse effects after consuming food containing
StarLink Tm corn. 33 Kraft Foods began a "voluntary" recall and, at the
corn products that were
request of the FDA, other companies recalled
34
.
StarLinkQ
contain
to
known
or
suspected
On September 29, 2000, after consulting with the USDA, the
EPA, and the FDA, Aventis agreed to purchase that year's crop of
StarLinkTM corn, which prevented the majority of the 2000 crop from
being used in processed foods. 135 In addition to the "voluntary" buyback program, in January of 2001, Aventis "voluntarily" signed an
agreement, with seventeen state attorney generals, legally binding the
company for four years to compensate not only farmers who grew
M
corn
StarLinkTM corn, but also farmers who did not grow StarLinkr
36
protein.
Cry9C
the
contain
but whose corn was found to
The EPA confirmed that StarLink m corn entered the human food
supply. 37 It is unclear exactly how much of the corn is presently in
the U.S. food supply, although current estimates are lower than
previous ones. 38 The risk of new StarLinkTM corn entering the food
133. See Ctr. for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, FDA Evaluation of Consumer
TM
ComplaintsLinked to Foods Allegedly ContainingStarLink Corn, at 2 (June 13, 2001). From
July 25, 2000 to April 20, 2001, the FDA received a total of sixty-three consumer complaints.
See id. at3.
134. See EPA Office of Pesticide Program, supranote 122, at Section C.
135. See id. The USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) would purchase from
TM
farmers any StarLink corn that they did not plan to use as animal feed, at a rate of $0.25 per
bushel over the CCC's posted price for the relevant county, and Aventis would reimburse the
CCC. Alternatively, farmers electing to use the corn as feed on their farms would be paid a
premium of $0.25 per bushel.
136. K.T. Arasu, U.S. States Ink StarLink Bio-corn Pact with Aventis (Jan. 23, 2001), at
(last
http'.//www.extension.iastate.edu/Pages/grain/news/starlink/starlink_jan/usstatesink.html
visited Jan. 6, 2002).
137. The EPA stated:
M
Test data from several sources demonstrate that StarLink corn was diverted into
human food. Data from Aventis, Kraft Corporation, and the Food and Drug
Administration confirmed the presence of Aventis' Cry9c DNA (the genetic material
necessary for the production of Cry9C) in Taco Bell taco shells when tested....

Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4,825 (Jan. 18, 2001).
138. An EPA Scientific Advisory Panel estimated that the amount of StarLink corn
currently in the food supply is lower than the EPA previously thought:
The revised Aventis dietary exposure assessment report assumes that 0.125% TMof corn
in all com-based foods, including those produced from white com, is StarLink grain
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supply also appears to be low.' 39 To prevent the further inundation of
According to testimony by the North American Millers Association at the July,
2001 SAP meeting, only 1.2% of 85,000 truckloads of corn received by dry millers
was found to test positive for StarLinkTM. There appears to be a high rate of
compliance with recommendations for testing incoming grain in the food corn
processing industry .... Loads of corn in which Cry9C protein is detected are likely to
be rejected. For these reasons, the SAP believes that the assumption of 0.125%
StarLink Tm com in the food supply is highly conservative.
...

Assuming a consistent program of testing grain entering food processing plants and
reductions of Cry9C protein due to processing... the Panel concluded that the levels
of Cry9C protein entering the U.S. food corn supply are very low. EPA estimated
current concentrations of Cry9C protein in food corn to be 0.34 ppb, using the Aventis
estimate of 5% rejection rate at corn dry mills ....
Based on the North American
Millers Association (NAMA) industry data showing 1.2% rejection rate, the
concentration in food corn samples could be as low as 0.1 ppb. Additionally, the
concentrations of Cry9C protein in both general grain stocks and the [U.S.] food corn
supply will decline rapidly after the 2001 crop is harvested and with each subsequent
production year.
See FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP), A Set ofScientificIssues Being Consideredby the
EnvironmentalProtectionAgency Regarding:Assessment of Additional Scientifc Information
ConcerningStarLinkTM Corn, SAP Rep. No. 2001-09, at 19-22 (July 25, 2001) [hereinafter
FIFRA SAP Report].
139. Furthermore, the SAP estimates that the risk of new StarLink corn entering the food
supply is "very small":
The risk of new Cry9C corn entering the food com supply from the 2001 and later
harvests has been managed. The original estimate of EPA in the December 2000 SAP
report (that U.S. corn stocks contain 0A% uncontrolled StarLinkTm) now appears to
be overstated, especially for cor offered for use in the food market. In fact, the Panel
concludes that even Aventis' estimate of 0.125% StarLinkTM corn in loads delivered
to food corn processors may be too high. The Panel believes that as long as direct food
corn users (dry millers, masa processors) continue to rigorously test to the lowest
available detection limits, there will be a very small and decreasing risk of producing
corn based foods with detectable Cry9C protein.
Id. at 25-26. However, as noted, this estimate depends on continued vigilance by market actors,
and will not be controlled by direct regulatory measures.
One observer has noted that there is an alternative method of regulating StarLinkn,:
There is another regulatory option available to Aventis, besides a tolerance exemption
from EPA, that would allow commerce to proceed. Aventis could ask FDA to regulate
low levels of Cry9C toxin in food as an unavoidable adulterant-a step that would not
jeopardize the integrity of the EPA's regulatory system for genetically engineered
products.
See Testimony of Rebecca Goldburg, PhD, to EPA's FIFRA Science Advisory Panel,
Comments Regarding the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Assessment of
Scientific Information Concerning Starlink Corn Cry9C Plant-Pesticide (Nov. 28, 2000), at
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the U.S. corn crop with hybrids containing Cry9C protein, the USDA,
through the CCC, offered to purchase non-StarLinkTM brands of
hybrid corn seed containing Cry9C. 40
The negative effects of the StarLinIJP event are far-reaching, with
the total cost to date estimated at approximately $1 billion. 14' The
corn market experienced significant disruption, including the cost of
testing for the presence of commingled StarLinkTm corn, the cost of
rerouting corn shipments rejected by processors because StarLinkT
is detected, and the cost and effort of devising methods to segregate
corn to avoid commingling. 4 These costs will continue to accrue as
long as StarLinkTM corn is present in the food supply.
In fact, cross-pollination may have affected the crops of farmers
who did not plant StarLink Tm corn, causing the controversial Cry9
protein to be found in their crops. Groups of such
farmers filed class
43
action suits against Aventis in Iowa and Illinois.
In addition to the effect on the domestic market, the United States
experienced a significant drop in its corn exports in late 2000 and
early 2001 as foreign markets expressed concern over genetically
modified corn." The Japanese discovered StarLink m corn in snacks
and animal feed, leading the U.S. Department of Agriculture to
negotiate an agreement with Japan to screen U.S. corn shipments.' 45
http://www.envirornentaldefense.org/programs/Health/StarLinkCom.html (last visited Jan. 2,
2002).
140. See EPA Office of Pesticide Programs, supranote 122, at Section C.
141. See David Barboza, As Biotech Crops Multiply, Consumers Get Little Choice, N.Y.
TIMES, June 10, 2001, at Al. "Seed companies, farmers, processors and food makers have spent
more than $1 billion in the last six months trying to eradicate Starlink. But most experts agree
that will take years." Id. It is not clear that this figure accounts for the impact on U.S. com
exports, discussed infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
142. William Lin et al., Impacts on the U.S. Corn Market and World Trade, in USDA's
FEED YEARBOOK 40-48 (2001), available at http://www.biotech-info.net/comimpacts.html
(last visited Jan. 7, 2001).
143. Anthony Shadid, Blown Profits: Genetic Drift Affects More Than Biology-U.S.
Farmers Stand to Lose Millions, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 8, 2001, at GI, available at 2001 WL
3928228.
144. The largest factor in declining exports was restrictions imposed on the use of
StarlinkTm corn in major U.S. export markets, particularly Japan and South Korea. See Lin et
al., supranote 142. Between November 2000 and February 2001, Japan's imports of U.S. corn
for starch manufacturing declined twenty-seven percent from the previous year, and Japan
turned to countries such as South Africa and Brazil to supply its com. See id.
145. See Philip Brasher, Biotech Corn Hurting U.S. Exports, Associated Press Online, Nov.
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Despite the public concern over StarLink' M corn, it is uncertain
whether the product actually poses a threat to human health. A report
issued by a Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) to the EPA on July 25,
2001 concluded:
The test [that FDA developed to determine whether individuals
had experienced an allergic reaction], as conducted, does not
eliminate StarLinkTm Cry9C protein as a potential cause of
allergic symptoms. The negative results decrease the
probability that the Cry9C protein is the cause of allergic
symptoms in the individuals examined.
[The test used by the FDA] does not eliminate the possibility
that the individuals.., reacted to the StarLinknl corn.
Additional studies are necessary to eliminate Cry9C proteins
1 46
as a potentialcausefor the allergicsymptoms reported.
Consumers who claimed to have adverse reactions to products
containing StarLink Tm corn filed a class action suit in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, but the court
preliminarily approved a proposed settlement on November 29,
47

2001.1

Aventis "voluntarily" withdrew the product registration for
StarLinkTn in January, 2001. In accepting the cancellation, the EPA
noted that:
[T]his cancellation is being proposed because Aventis has
failed to ensure that StarLinknl corn will not be diverted to
human food, [sic] it is incumbent on any proponent of further
use to demonstrate either: (1) That further use will not be
corn is safe for
diverted to human food, or (2) that StarLinkI
17, 2000, available at http://www.connectotel.com/gmfoodlapl71100.txt (last visited Jan. 23,
2002).
146. See FIFRA SAP Report, supranote 138, at 29-30.
147. See The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois' findings of November
29, 2001, available at http://vww.starlinkcom.com/ConsumerClassAction Settlement/Findings
.pdf(last visited Jan. 8, 2002).
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not

present

an

Currently, according to Aventis, StarLink corn has not
49 been
commercialized in any country other than the United States.
It is not clear what standard the EPA will apply in determining
whether Aventis sufficiently established that StarLinkTm does not
present an unreasonable risk. It is not clear whether the company
must prove with one hundred percent certainty that there is no risk of
an allergic reaction in humans or if some lesser standard should
apply. Moreover, it is unclear whether the EPA should hold Aventis
financially responsible for any injuries sustained in the event of an
allergic reaction. Several aspects of the Starlink TM story constitute
regulatory50failures on the part of the federal government, particularly
the EPA.1
First, the EPA's labeling requirements for StarlinkTm corn seed,
described above, ignored the realities of the agricultural growing and
crop collection and distribution system. This system could not
148. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4,825 (Jan. 18,
2001).
149. Aventis states:
This technology is not currently being developed or commercialized anywhere in the
world, including the USA. Furthermore, Aventis CropScience has committed that the
Cry9C technology will not be commercialized unless and until the necessary scientific
methodology is developed to demonstrate to the EPA that, indeed, Cry9C may be
safely registered for any end use.
Aventis CropScience is continuing its efforts to identify, contain and redirect corn
containing Cry9C protein to animal feed and non-food, industrial uses in the US.
These uses are fully authorized by the US Environmental Protection Agency.
Aventis, Current Status of StarLink Corn, available at http://www.starlinkcom.com/
Current%20Status/Current%20Status.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2002). In light of the voluntary
T
withdrawal of the StarLink m
registration, the EPA will not consider extension of the original
registration. See The EPA Biopesticides Registration Action Document, supra note 120, at 11,
available at http'/www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/otherdocslbtbrad2/1%20overview.
pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2002).
150. To hold the EPA entirely responsible, though, would be to ignore what might be
described as an inherent flaw of the Coordinated Framework and the "blinders on" approach
taken by the federal agencies to regulation in this area: neither USDA, which regulates
agriculture, nor FDA, which regulates food safety, seem to have played any meaningful part in
reviewing the EPA's proposed efforts at the time of registration to control the distribution of
Starlink TM corn products, despite the fact that in all likelihood the EPA knew less about the
issues involved in meaningful regulation on this issue than they did.
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realistically provide the segregation on which the EPA sought to
insist, at least without substantial additional enforcement and
administrative requirements. EPA's labeling requirements were
therefore essentially "paper" requirements.''
Second, based on a review of the public record described above,
none of the parties involved: Aventis; seed dealers; seed buyers;
growers; crop collectors such as silos; or grain handling companies
seem to have been sanctioned for failure to observe or impose the
EPA labeling restrictions. The government's failure to impose
sanctions, beyond Aventis' agreement to absorb various costs for
predictable failures to observe restrictions imposed by its registration
requirements, was tantamount to an admission that the requirements
were unenforceable at the outset.
Third, the EPA failed to use its authority in permitting the use of
Starlink mT seed to establish which parties within the agricultural
production and distribution system were required to accept
responsibility for failure to observe and/or enforce its regulatory
restrictions. Although the EPA required Aventis to engage in labeling
and to obligate contractually others to observe the labeling
restrictions, this situation effectively permitted Aventis to disclaim
liability for failures to observe the labeling restrictions and did not
force observance of the restrictions. Given the structure of the
agricultural production and distribution system in the United States, it
is entirely possible that had the EPA insisted on establishing clear
responsibility throughout the agricultural production and distribution
system for failures to observe restrictions, and to require monitoring
and enforcement of such responsibilities before permitting the use of
StarlinkTm seed, the marketplace would not have been willing to
seed because of increased administrative costs
accept the use of 1the
52
and liability risks.
151. It is one thing to rely on this "paper" enforcement structure of labeling and contracts
in the control of agricultural chemicals, which are likely to cause only localized damage if
misused. It is quite another to employ the same system in the case of products that may enter
the food supply that can actually cause demonstrable damage to other crops miles away from
their site of use, or even possibly hundreds or thousands of miles away. See NRC Report, supra
note 1, at 91; see also Mexican maize, infra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
152. This result appears to be precisely what happened to another potential Aventis product
M
T
for soybeans, Libertylink , which was reportedly "voluntarily" withdrawn from the market-
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Fourth, it should be a source of embarrassment to the EPA that an
environmental group, rather than the EPA or Aventis, actually
discovered the contamination of the food supply that resulted from
the unlawful distribution in commerce of StarlinkTM com. If the EPA
is going to establish a set of restrictions on the use of an agricultural
biotechnology product, it has a responsibility to the public to make
certain that those restrictions are being observed. There is no
substantial evidence that the EPA met this responsibility here.
These regulatory failures with respect to Starlink Tm corn were
avoidable. The federal government had sufficient legal authority to
design and impose more effective regulations for the control of
StarlinkTM corn. Effective regulations would have been able to
achieve better results and perhaps to avoid large unnecessary costs
for Aventis. These regulatory failures do not, alone, call into question
either the utility of agricultural biotechnology or the safety of
Starlink TM corn. It is unreasonable, nevertheless, to expect that the
public will accept inadequate regulations like those imposed in the
case of StarlinkT corn as a basis for public acceptance of agricultural
biotechnology, particularly where food products are concerned.
B. The "Surprising"Case of Mexican Maize Contaminatedwith
Genetically Engineered Corn Genes
On October 2, 2001, the New York Times reported that maize
growing in fifteen different locations in Mexico contained genetically
engineered genes. 153 The research leading to the discoveries was
at the urging of trade groups representing crop producers-because the soybeans had not
received import clearance in overseas markets. See American Soybean Association New, ASA
Lands AgrEvo Decision to Protect U.S. Export Markets by Delaying Commercialization of
LibertyLinkV Soybeans (Mar. 10, 1999), available at http://www.asa-hamburg_de/gen n6.html.
153. Carol K. Yoon, Genetic Modification Taints Corn in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,
2001, at F7.
According to the report:
In a finding that has taken researchers by surprise and alarmed environmentalists, the
Mexican government has discovered that some of the country's native corn varieties
have been contaminated with genetically engineered DNA. The contaminated seeds
were collected from a region considered to be the world's center of diversity for
corn-exactly the kind of repository of genetic variation that environmentalists and
many scientists had hoped to protect from contamination. The result was unexpected
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conducted by researchers from the United States and the Mexican

because genetically modified corn, the presumed source of the foreign genes, has not
been approved for commercial planting in Mexico.
Scientists expressed concern that the foreign genes could act to reduce genetic
diversity in the country's native corn varieties and in the wild progenitor of
domesticated corn, known as teosinte. If any of the foreign genes are very
advantageous, plants carrying those genes could begin to dominate the population. In
such cases genetic variation will be lost as the diversity of plants not carrying the
foreign genes decreases or disappears. Whether that will happen or has happened
remains unknown.
In addition to being one of the world's most important crops, corn is viewed with a
near religious reverence in Mexico, with seeds of native varieties passed down from
generation to generation. Until now, scientists said researchers had assumed that these
varieties, some of which are grown only by subsistence farmers in remote areas, were
pristine.
"These are the extremes, the places where you would really not expect to find
contamination," said Dr. Ignacio Chapela, a microbial ecologist at the University of
California at Berkeley, saying the results are an indication of widespread
contamination. "The only reason they found it there is because that's the only place
they've looked."
Scientists said the results also indicated that crop genes might be able to spread across
geographic areas and varieties more quickly than researchers had guessed.
"It shows in today's modem world how rapidly genetic material can move from one
place to another," said Dr. Norman C. Ellstrand, evolutionary biologist at University of
California at Riverside. He said the real worry was that other foreign genes-like
pharmaceutical-producing genes being developed in crops--could also find their way
quickly and unnoticed into distant food sources. Mexico's Ministry of the
Environment and Natural Resources made the announcement on Sept. 18 that
contaminated com had been found in 15 different localities. The announcement
credited Dr. Chapela with the initial discovery but described only the results from
government-led research. Neither Dr. Chapela' s team nor the Mexican teams' work
has yet been published.
Scientists assume the native corn became contaminated through interbreeding with Bt
corn, but how Bt coin may have come to be planted in Mexico remains a matter of
speculation. While not approved for planting, biotech corn is legally imported into
Mexico for use in food. The Mexican government has not disclosed exactly what
genes were found.
Exequiel Ezcurra, the director of the National Institute of Ecology, which worked on
the study, did not respond to requests for an interview. But Dr. Chapela, who is
familiar with the Mexican work, said the researchers had identified the presence of
DNA sequences from the cauliflower mosaic virus. This DNA is used nearly
universally in genetically engineered plants and does not produce Bt insecticide. As a
result, it is still unclear whether any of the contaminated corn has the ability to produce
the Bt insecticide.
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government. 54 Mexican maize was thought to be a relatively pure
strain of corn that was grown using conventional techniques in
Mexico for thousands of years. 155 Virtually all of the permitting
regulatory risk analysis for the use of Bt corn assumes that the pollen
generated by that corn, containing Bt-produced endotoxins as well as
the ability to reproduce such Bt corn, will travel only a few hundred
feet from the plants. 56 It was regarded as "surprising" that
genetically engineered corn genes would be found in maize growing
in Mexico only five years after
the planting of such corn was first
157
permitted in the United States.
The point of the Mexican maize mystery is not that it necessarily
indicates that any particularly harmful result occurred.15 8 What is at
stake instead is a regulatory quality issue. If the genetic
contamination occurred through planting, the lesson to be drawn is
that genetically modified corn should not be planted in Mexico. If
such planting occurred in a number of different locations, this result
indicates a lack of necessary controls on either the part of the U.S.
government, the Mexican government, or both. Alternatively, the
genetic contamination occurred as a result of pollen spread from U.S.
planted crops, this result would suggest that current regulatory
assumptions about pollen travel and transfer may be seriously
mistaken. In either event, it is incumbent upon U.S. regulators to
determine conclusively the source of the genetically engineered
material, which is very likely of U.S. origin. This determination will
154. Id. More recent news reports indicate that there is a question about the accuracy of the
original test data demonstrating genetic contamination of Mexican maize. On April 5, 2002, the
New York Times reported that the scientific journal Nature had stated that based on its further
review of criticisms of the original data, the "evidence available is not sufficient to justify
publication of the original paper" that reported the contamination results. Carol K. Yoon,
Journal Raises Doubts on Biotech Study, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2002, at A19. The New York
Times continued, however. "The conclusion of contamination [in Mexican maize] has largely
remained unchallenged. Instead, scientists have focused their criticism on data suggesting that
genetically engineered DNA might behave in unexpected ways, scattering around the
genome. . ." Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. However, an invasion of an ecosystem by an exotic should always be of management
concern because ecosystems often lack defenses against exotics, and so can be destroyed by
them.
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make it possible to impose better controls or to improve regulatory
assumptions made in permitting genetically altered products to be
made and sold. Information regarding the origin of genetically
engineered material in crops grown in other countries is information
the U.S. regulatory system should have already obtained through the
permitting, monitoring, and enforcement process. Its failure to obtain
such information is a form of regulatory failure.'59 The U.S.
regulatory system and U.S. agriculture, including agricultural
exporters, can ill afford to be "surprised" in this manner if they are to
achieve public acceptance for their products. As a matter of U.S.
foreign policy, the United States can ill afford the loss of
international credibility resulting from such surprises, and U.S.
taxpayers should not be expected to bear any of the resulting costs or
damages.
C.Lessonsfrom the TransgenicSalmon Case Study
Salmon are unusual fish. Salmon have an unusual life history that
adapted them well to the demands of several rigorous environments.
This exceptional adaptation to particularly harsh environments
suggests that the genetic makeup of salmon is distinctive but,
unfortunately, it is not well understood.6 0 Salmon populations are in
decline in most of the lower forty-eight United States because of a
159. In the same vein, the NRC Report sharply criticized the fact that federal regulators do
not have accurate information about the impact of Bt corn on nontarget organisms. The NRC

Report stated:
Given that Bt corn is already planted over millions of acres in the United States, it
seems appropriate for EPA, USDA, or registrants to sponsor careful field tests to
determine whether lacewings or other natural enemies of crop pests are adversely
affected by Bt com.
NRC Report, supra note 1, at 113. The NRC Report therefore recommended that the "EPA
should provide guidelines for determining the most ecologically relevant test organisms and test
procedures for assessing nontarget effects in specific cropping systems." Id.
160. The uncertainty regarding salmon biology is evident in the resources expended by the
federal government to study the conditions necessary for salmon survival. See, e.g., Statement
of Jamie Rappaport Clark, Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior,
Before the Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans of the House
Resources Committee, Regarding the Agency's Fiscal Year 2001 Budget Request (Mar. 23,
2000), available at http//Ilaws.fws.gov/testimon/2000test/budgetma.htm.
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combination of habitat and demand pressure.' 61 Recently, the federal
government declared certain salmon populations to be either
threatened or endangered species.' 62
The federal government has not yet agreed to permit the release 1of
63
genetically modified or "transgenic" salmon into the environment.
However, it is well known that such transgenic salmon are under
development, and it probably will be necessary for the government to
grant a permit for their release into the environment." In anticipation
of such a request, federal government agencies responsible for such
permitting undertook a case study to analyze the issues that would be
presented by a request to permit such transgenic salmon farming.'65
Ironically, this case study discloses that the government's efforts to
regulate existing conventional salmon fish farming, when it approved
permits for such farming, constitute a form of regulatory failure.
Unless the government fully addresses the failure of the regulatory
process, unfortunate and potentially irreversible results are likely to
occur.
1. Conventional Salmon Fish Farming
Conventional salmon fish farming is a substantial and growing
industry. In salmon fish farming, salmon are first bred in a manner
intended to make them sterile, and then confined in pens in the ocean
during the growing cycle. 6 6 The purpose of sterile breeding is to
avoid interbreeding with other salmon populations, including wild
161. See, e.g., National Wildlife Federation, Case Study: Salmon, available at
www.nwf.org/population/Salmon.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2002) (noting that commercial
fishing and habitat degradation have contributed to the decline of wild salmon populations).
162. See Case Studies, supra note 35, Case Study One, at 1; Deskbook, supra note 35, at
113.
163. See Case Studies, supranote 35, Case Study One, at 1-2; Deskbook, supranote 35, at
113-14.
164. See Case Study, supra note 35, Case Study One, at 30; Deskbook, supra note 35, at
142. The regulatory structure for this permitting is different than that described above for plant
products, and will involve additional federal agencies, including the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers and the Department of the Interior. Case Studies, supra note 35, Case Study One, at
1; Deskbook, supranote 35, at 113.
165. See Case Studies, supra note 35, at Case Study One, at 1; Deskbook, supranote 35, at
113.
166. See Case Studies, supra note 35, at Case Study One, at 4; Deskbook, supranote 35, at
116.
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salmon, in the event of an escape from the pens.167 The purpose of
confinement in pens is to permit the fish to be easily recaptured at the
end of the growing cycle when they are to be harvested, but this
confinement also has the effect of limiting interbreeding. 68 The
federal agencies that permit fish farming to occur assumed that sterile
breeding would be successful, and that even in those cases where
sterile breeding was not successful, escape from pens would not
occur. 169 In the event that escape of a nonsterile fish did occur, it was
assumed that the nonsterile fish would be unlikely to survive and
interbreed due to environmental factors, including predation and
geographic separation.170 In short, the regulatory agencies took
comfort from the idea that there were multiple barriers to the
interbreeding of fanned and wild species of salmon.
The federal agency case study on transgenic salmon discloses that
each of the assumptions that supported the idea that the salmon fish
farms could indeed prevent farmed and wild salmon species
interbreeding were to some extent contrary to reality. First, the
techniques used to ensure sterility of the fanned salmon are not one
hundred percent reliable.' Second, fish escape from salmon pens
with reasonable frequency because the ocean is a harsh environment
and pens are not an especially robust containment system for
economic reasons.172 Third, the escaped fish survive outside the pens
and reproduce with reasonable frequency. 73 In other words, not one
of the "containment system" assumptions made by federal regulatory
authorities proved wholly accurate when judged against real world
experience. Nor is this situation the first time that authorities

167.
116.
168.
note 35,
169.
118.
170.
118.
171.
116.

See Case Studies, supra note 35, at Case Study One, at 4; Deskbook, supranote 35, at
See generally Case Studies, supra note 35, at Case Study One, at 5; Deskbook, supra
at 117.
See Case Studies, supra note 35, at Case Study One, at 6; Deskbook, supranote 35, at
See Case Studies, supra note 35, at Case Study One, at 6; Deskbook, supranote 35, at
See Case Studies, supranote 35, at Case Study One, at4; Deskbook, supranote 35, at

172. See Case Studies, supra note 35, at Case Study One, at 23; Deskbook, supra note 35,
at 135.
173. See Case Studies, supranote 35, at Case Study One, at 5; Deskbook, supranote 35, at
117.
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underestimated the ability of salmon as a species to survive. As the
federal agency study acknowledges, because it was assumed that
salmon would not survive in fresh water, more than 20,000 salmon
fry were flushed into the Great Lakes in the early 1970s. 74 The result
175
was an explosion of the population of salmon in the Great Lakes.
The containment steps required by existing conventional salmon
fish farming permittees will slow down, but will not eliminate, the
transfer of genetic material between the farmed and wild salmon
species. This result would not be significant if the wild and farmed
species were essentially equivalent, so that genetic transfer between
them was of no consequence. No one knows, however, whether this
conclusion is reasonable. In fact, there is reason to believe, based on
the quality of the adaptation made by the wild salmon to their
environment, that they contain valuable genetic material that could
prove very useful if isolated and properly understood. If the wild
species is extinguished by interbreeding with farmed salmon, this
genetic material may be irretrievably lost.
2. Transgenic Salmon Permitting
The transgenic salmon under development are apparently prized
by their developers because they can grow substantially faster than
conventional salmon as a result of added genetic material, thus
cutting the cost of production by shortening the time to market.' 76
Many of the same issues raised by the government's failure to
properly regulate conventional salmon fish farming are raised by
transgenic salmon farming.
Transgenic salmon permitting poses an additional risk. Transgenic
salmon grow more quickly and may be better competitors for food
supply, and thus may prove more successful in mating. In other
words, if the transgenic salmon escape confinement, and can breed,
they may decrease genetic variation when interbreeding with the wild
174. See Case Studies, supranote 35, at Case Study One, at 8; Deskbook, supranote 35, at
120.
175. See Case Studies, supra note 35, at Case Study One, at 8; Deskbook, supra note 35, at
120.
176. See Case Studies, supra note 35, at Case Study One, at 1; Deskbook, supra note 35, at
113.
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population.177 Over time, the result would be a decline of the total
population of wild-type salmon.
Thus, the past experience of the federal government with permits
for conventional salmon fish farming shows that it is necessary to
substantially improve its permitting process in the ease of transgenic
salmon. The result of regulatory failure in that respect might be the
irreversible collapse of wild salmon populations, despite their status
as threatened or endangered species.
3. Lessons from the Inadequacy of the Coordinated Framework
with Respect to Pest-Protected Plants
In view of the prominence of pest-protected plants in agricultural
biotechnology today, it is striking to note that such plants were not
regulated by the Coordinated Framework.'78 The EPA's failure to
promulgate scientifically justifiable final regulations to govern pestprotected plants until after it granted permits allowing the planting of
millions of acres of such plants is, in itself, a significant form of
regulatory failure.
Although the NRC Report on pest-protected plants can be fairly
described as supportive of the use of agricultural biotechnology,
careful reading discloses that it is also sharply critical of the quality
of regulation that occurred to date. First, the NRC Report criticized
the scientific basis of major exemptions from plant-pesticide
regulation proposed by the EPA. Second, the NRC Report concluded
that "[t]he scope of product reviews, as delineated by USDA and
EPA, has the potential to result in gaps in regulatory coverage."' 79 In
particular, the NRC Report noted that the USDA regulates only
177. See Case Studies, supranote 35, at Case Study One, at 23; Deskbook, supra note 35,
at 135.
178. NRC Report, supra note 1, at 145:
What the framework left unresolved were jurisdictional issues that would have to be
addressed before commercial introduction of a number of products, including
transgenic plants that were modified to resist disease and ward off insect pests. In fact,
plants modified to exhibit pesticidal traits were not specifically addressed by the
coordinated framework.
179. Id. at 161.
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GMOs that it thinks are produced using "plant pests."' 8 ° As the NRC
Report noted, "[m]any plants do not automatically meet the definition
of a 'plant pest." ' 181 In other words, according to the NRC, the
development of new techniques for genetically engineering crops
means that "the scope of USDA's regulations might now fail to
genetically engineered crops that the agency wishes
encompass some
182
to regulate.
Third, the NRC Report notes that in the case of regulating Bt
cotton, the EPA and the USDA reached significantly different
183
conclusions on whether any regulation at all should be required.
The USDA concluded that such cotton could be permitted without
restrictions, because of the USDA's narrow regulatory focus limited
to plant pests. 184 The EPA, on the other hand, placed "geographic
restrictions on the planting of Bt cotton until additional information
could be provided to adequately assess the potential for and
' 85
consequences of transfer of the Bt gene to related species.'
Remarkably, even though the reviews of Bt cotton by the two
agencies occurred within months of each other, "[t]he agencies
indicated that they did not communicate with one another on this
issue before making their regulatory determinations.' ' 86 According to
the NRC, the complete failure of the agencies to communicate when
making essentially the same regulatory decision, combined with their
sharply differing regulatory conclusions, "may have resulted in
stakeholder confusion and raised questions about the credibility of
assessments."' 87
In short, based on the NRC Report's review of this part of the
agricultural biotechnology regulatory system, it would be difficult to
describe U.S. regulation of pest-protected plants as comprehensive,
consistent, or thorough. This description does not mean that there are
inherent dangers to the creation or use of genetically created pest180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Seeid.
See id.
See id. at 165-66.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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protected plants. What it does mean, however, is that the federal
government needs to decide whether it is willing to make necessary
improvements to its regulatory process or, alternatively, whether the
tort liability system will be permitted to establish limitations on the
use of such technology."

VII. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY
REGULATION IN LIGHT OF SUSTAINABILITY PRINCIPLES

The existing regulation of agricultural biotechnology has
significant flaws, as described above. The question presented here is,
essentially, whether the regulation of biotechnology demands
distinctively better regulation than what presently exists for
conventional agricultural products. This issue can be addressed by
analyzing how well the regulatory system meets the sustainability
criteria discussed above and considers marginal costs and benefits.
A. Sustainable Yield and BiodiversityMaintenance
The need for sustainable yield management and biodiversity
maintenance exists in both conventional agriculture and agricultural
biotechnology. In both cases, there is a clear tension between the
range of possible improvements in crop varieties, and weed and pest
control, and adaptations that can rapidly defeat such improvements
and even, in the worst case, cause major crop losses or severe
resource losses such as soil erosion or soil damage. This tension
requires the federal government to take seriously the need to diversify
and protect available agricultural resources, especially soil quality,
water quality, and crop diversity. During the twentieth century, the
federal government appropriately sought to conserve soil resources,
188. An example of the operation of the tort liability system would be informal
compensation and/or litigation over the performance of Roundup Ready TM crop seed, which
allegedly failed to perform properly when used. See Ronnie Cummins, Monsanto's "Roundup
Ready" Cotton Bombs in the USA, MOTION MAO. (Oct. 21, 1997), available at
http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/cotton.html (describing potential class action lawsuit
against Monsanto on behalf of cotton growers who suffered crop losses when Roundup Ready
Cotton failed to grow properly).
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protect food supply from contamination and monoculture, limit the
use of pesticides, and prevent the spread of noxious weeds through
various means including herbicides.' 89 The federal government,
however, has not taken its responsibility to manage resources for
sustainable yield and biodiversity maintenance as seriously as it
should have with respect to both the resources it owns and the way in
which the private sector produces its agricultural products. The
federal government recognizes only in general terms that these
considerations should be substantial factors in making agricultural
resource decisions of various kinds. 90
One potentially significant difference between conventional and
biotechnology agriculture is the speed and scale upon which change
in crop composition, and hence habitat alteration, might occur. By
markedly altering the economics of crop production, at least in the
short run, biotechnology developments can potentially alter crop
characteristics more widely and more quickly than can conventional
agriculture. In addition, genetically modified plants and animals may,
in some cases, not have natural predators in the ecosystems in which
they are introduced, and may, as a result, have the same adverse
impacts as a conventionally bred "exotic" species. Accordingly,
although regulators may not generally need to treat sustainable yield
and biodiversity maintenance issues fundamentally differently where
conventional agriculture and agricultural biotechnology are
concerned, there may be exceptions. In some cases, regulators may
need to require more intensive premarket testing of some GMOs to
provide additional scientific information on issues related to
sustainable yield and biodiversity or to require physical limits on the
extent of introduction of those new GMOs until they have a
reasonable period of actual testing in commercial use. One such
example is the limits the EPA imposed on the planting of Bt cotton. If
an industry sponsor of a new GMO wishes to avoid such regulatory
189. For example, FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y, controls the presence of pesticides on the
market, and the FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., protects the safety of the food supply.
190. Improving the federal government's capacity to manage resources for sustainable
yield and biodiversity would need to be the subject of a different article. In fact, in the newly
significant context of bioterrorism, which could be conducted both through conventional and
genetic engineering technologies, the federal government would be well advised to reexamine
its capabilities in these areas.
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restrictions, perhaps the sponsor should be prepared to provide some
form of reasonable financial compensation in the event that
unanticipated damage occurs to the crops of other growers, or to
other field organisms or conventionally bred competitors, or if an
increased need for chemical control results from the expanded use of
the GMO.' 9'
B. Internalizationof Costs
As shown by the Starlinkn' and other regulatory failure episodes
described above, agricultural biotechnology is not yet being required
to fully internalize its social costs. 92 All of the case studies
considered above share the characteristics that unintended "escape"
of GMO material from a containment system created through
regulation occurred, or is likely to occur, with varying degrees of
harm resulting from the escape. This type of unintended escape is a

social cost that regulators must fully account for and control. This
regulatory failure to require full cost internalization constitutes an
important failure by U.S. agricultural biotechnology policy to meet
sustainability criteria. It is a failure that must be rectified either by
improvements in the regulatory process or by adjustments made
through the tort liability system. This issue will be discussed further
in the next section.
191. For example, a GMO sponsor might purchase insurance coverage that would be able
to be called on in the event that unanticipated damage of specified types occurred during the
trial period. Such insurance might well be expensive, but there is no reason for the public to
bear these unanticipated costs that result from premature introduction of a GMO.
192. There are assertions that biotechnology regulation involves excessive costs, or, at
least, that costs should not be made higher. For example, industry sources claim that over $3
billion were spent in permitting Bt plant products. See Abramson & Carrato, supranote 49, at
257. However, the proper standard for the appropriate cost of regulation is that it should cost no
more than is needed to impose regulations that will force the full internalization of social cost,
not that the cost of regulation should meet some arbitrary, predetermined standard. If regulation
is excessive, industry should challenge it by demonstrating that various aspects of the regulation
are unnecessary. Particularly in the area of biotechnology, the government has seemed to be
willing to consider such assertions seriously and to modify regulatory requirements where such
demonstrations could be persuasively made.
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C. Public Participationand Transparency
On both public participation and transparency dimensions, the
process of agricultural biotechnology regulation has historically
fallen below the standards set by the United States in other areas of
environmental law. In virtually all other areas of environmental law,
the United States is a world leader in public participation and
transparency, often as a result of congressional authorization through
statutory citizen action provisions, with fundamentally positive
results."
The major federal regulatory agencies appear to have belatedly
recognized that they can improve both the transparency of
decisionmaking and public participation in the regulation of
agricultural biotechnology. Thus, for example, the FDA proposed to
require premarket notification for biotechnology products that would
be used as food.'94 Various regulatory agencies agreed to do a better
job of policing the use of overbroad confidential business information
claims that may prevent public scrutiny of the health and safety
impacts of new biotechnology developments. 195 Although it is
essential to safeguard industry rights to intellectual property in the
regulatory process, it seems clear that better mechanisms can be
developed to permit at least indirect public review of health and

193. The right of citizens to participate in and to challenge government regulatory action in
court is one of the most distinctive features of American environmental law. In many cases it is
responsible for preventing "regulatory capture," a phenomenon that limits the effectiveness of
government regulation so often in other areas of American regulation, and is even more
prominent in most other countries.
194. The FDA recently proposed to move from voluntary to mandatory premarket
notification of biotechnology foods.
The proposed rule would require companies to provide notice of the intent to market a
biotechnology food in the U.S. at least 120 days prior to commercial distribution
through the submission of a Pre-market Biotechnology Notice ("PBN"). The PBN
would include data and information about the food and a narrative discussing the data
and information. The applicant must also agree to provide additional relevant data and
information upon the Agency's request. The public would have ready access to the
PBN and the Agency's response to it.
See Abramson & Carrato, supra note 49, at 252-53.
195. For example, the USDA has provided clarification on the type of submitted
information that may be designated as confidential business information. See NRC Report,
supra note I, at 174.
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safety issues in the regulatory process. 9'
All in all, the historical experience of other U.S. industries that
employed controversial technologies, or were engaged in
controversial business practices that had apparent potential for
significant environmental and health effects, demonstrates that public
support is an essential part of developing a successful new industry.
Increased transparency and public participation in the regulatory
process is an essential part of obtaining this public support and can
actually avoid calls for more onerous public regulation either before
or after development of new technology. Accordingly, Congress
should consider imposing on the federal regulatory agencies
requirements that they collect certain types of scientific data either
before or after permitting various agricultural biotechnology
products, such as the various studies recommended by the NRC
Report, and that they make such data available for public review.
VIII. ALTERNATIVE FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR SOCIAL CONTROL OF
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY

The EU seems to have embarked on a path toward more
aggressive regulation of agricultural biotechnology. The EU proposed
regulations that would require traceability of GMO food and feed
products, regulations that would require additional labeling of such
products, and regulations or international agreements that would
permit countries to operate on the basis of the "precautionary
principle" with respect to many GMOs, should they choose. 197 The
industry is opposed to all of these
U.S. agricultural biotechnology
198
regulatory changes.
It is certainly possible to view the proposed European changes as,
196. For example, federal agencies might develop considerably more extensive networks of
outside "peer reviewers" for such issues than presently exist. In principle, there is no reason that
members of the public with the necessary technical backgrounds could not execute appropriate
confidentiality undertakings that would permit them to engage in necessary technical reviews
while safeguarding a project sponsor's intellectual property.
197. See Commission on the European Communities, supranote 109.
198. For example, thirty-eight organizations in the agri-food industry, including the trade
association Biotechnology Industry Organization, urged President Clinton not to change the
current FDA policy regarding labeling of biotech foods. See Letter to President Clinton (Nov.
12, 1999), availableat http://www.bio.org/food&ag/l 1 12letter.html.
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in many respects, little more than efforts to maintain trade barriers in
favor of conventional European food producers. However, the
European regulatory changes discussed above all involve efforts to
subject GMO food and feed products to consumer and public choice
and pressure. The changes also permit vetoes on the introduction of
certain GMO products by European countries in the event of
scientific uncertainty. 199 Taken together, they adopt a model for
regulation similar, in some respects, to U.S. environmental law, if it
were adapted to GMO food and feed products.
The American agricultural biotechnology industry prefers the U.S.
food and drug regulation model instead of European-style
regulation.2" In order to make this position ultimately defensible to
the public, industry must persuade policymakers and the public both
that agricultural biotechnology has very limited risks and that federal
agency regulators can be counted on to require and enforce regulation
that will control any remaining risks. As has been shown, there is
definite support for at least the first of these contentions, but the
second contention ultimately has its limits in light of the history of
agricultural biotechnology regulatory failure and the limits of existing
scientific knowledge. Improvements in federal agency regulation are
therefore clearly necessary if long term public acceptance of GMO
plant, food, and feed products is to occur. At the same time, if the
agricultural biotechnology industry wants to make certain that it does
not eventually face public demands for European style regulation and
a shift in the basic burden of proof for permitting new products akin
to the "precautionary principle," it is probably going to have to accept
a reasonable degree of tort liability to provide both compensation for
harm and deterrence against unduly risky conduct.
199. See Francer, supranote 6, at 309-10.
200. Under the "food and drug" regulation model, individual states cannot set more
stringent health and safety requirements for introduction of food and drugs into commerce than
those set by the federal government because such state regulation is preempted by federal law.
While this limitation means that industry is able to avoid local protectionism, it also means that
members of the public are required to accept the idea that the federal government is better able
to protect their health and safety than state authorities, which is not uniformly true. A "level
playing field" argument is often made against European-style regulations, asserting that such
regulations discriminate against biotechnology. This argument is quite correct, but is unlikely to
change matters in terms of obtaining public support for biotechnology.
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IX. CLARIFYING THE TORT LIABILITY REGIME FOR AGRICULTURAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS

At present, it is uncertain what type of liability regime will be
applied to harm caused by agricultural biotechnology products.2"'
Because agricultural biotechnology products are potentially socially

useful products, and agricultural biotechnology is not inherently
dangerous, the higher the quality of federal regulatory review of

agricultural biotechnology, the lower the level of tort liability for
remaining harm the industry should be required to assume. Assuming
that the regulatory system is indeed improved in the directions
discussed above, there is a reasonable policy argument that
agricultural biotechnology product tort liability should be limited in

certain key respects sketched out below. It might be preferable for the
industry to seek legislative clarification concerning the appropriate

liability regime rather than waiting for the issue to be resolved in the

courts.' 2 Development of a consensus on appropriate liability rules
through the legislative process or some other means should
strengthen public confidence in agricultural biotechnology.
Broadly speaking, harm caused by agricultural biotechnology
could theoretically be divided into four categories: harm caused by
permit violations; harm caused to protected natural resources; harm
caused to conventional crops and conventionally bred animals; and
human health harms.

201. Several articles surveyed the tort liability regime that may be applied to
biotechnology products. For the reader's information, and without meaning to endorse any of
their conclusions, see, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Barbara A. Boczar, Biotechnology and Tort
Liability:A Strategic Industry at Risk, 55 U. PrITt. L. REv. 791 (1994); Charles A. Deacon &
Emilie K. Paterson, Emerging Trends in Biotechnology Litigation, 20 REV. LITIG. 589 (2001);
Julie A. Davies & Lawrence C. Levine, Biotechnology's Challenge to the Lmv of Torts, 32
McGEORGE L. REv. 221 (2000).
202. The reasons for this preference have to do with the inconsistency of results that may
occur in litigation given the uncertainty regarding appropriate liability standards, and its very
substantial costs. Moreover, a fair amount of litigation regarding damage allegedly done by
agricultural biotechnology may occur in the context of class action lawsuits, which are often
exceptionally time consuming and expensive. Finally, clear legislative standards governing
industry liability may be necessary to make industry operations insurable by private insurers.
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A. Harm Caused as a Result of Permit Violations
An improved regulatory system will be the foundation of social
protection against the risks of agricultural biotechnology until there is
sufficient scientific data to accurately and fully assess the risks of
biotechnology products in advance. Accordingly, agricultural
biotechnology products as to which there are significant scientific
uncertainties should be subject to strict liability for harms caused, if
such harms are caused by violations of regulatory permit conditions.
Exemptions from this requirement can be made on a case-by-case
basis as experience grows.
A rule of strict liability for such harms will ensure the
enforceability of such regulatory permit conditions and limit the need
for the government to add additional regulatory requirements or
increase enforcement resources. In some cases where there are
particularly large uncertainties about a particular biotechnology
product and potential for large harms related to those uncertainties,
regulatory authorities may need to consider a requirement for
financial assurance to be provided by the project sponsor to ensure
that if harm occurs as a result of a permit violation, a permit applicant
will have the financial resources to pay the resulting costs. In any
event, fine and penalty provisions of federal law relating to
agricultural biotechnology permit violations should be strictly
enforced; Congress should appropriate sufficient funds so that
regulatory agencies and law enforcement entities have the necessary
resources to ensure such enforcement occurs.
B. Harm Caused to ProtectedNaturalResources
There is substantial evidence that agricultural biotechnology
products, such as transgenic salmon, can adversely affect natural
resources, such as wild salmon populations, if not properly regulated.
Agricultural biotechnology products should be subject to strict
liability for harm caused at least to those natural resources that
receive special statutory protection, such as the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act or the Endangered Species Act, in the same manner and
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on the same basis as would be true for harm to such resources caused
by products of conventional agriculture or its operations.
Consideration may also need to be given to requiring financial
assurance for both conventional agriculture and agricultural
biotechnology products with respect to certain types of federally
permitted environmental releases that may cause irreversible
environmental damage, such as extinction of a species.
C.Harm Caused to Conventional Crops and Conventionally Bred
Animals
Absent a regulatory permit violation, agricultural biotechnology
products should generally be subject to liability for harm caused to
crops and conventionally bred animals only on the basis of fault, such
as negligence.2 3 However, the government should develop a low cost
means, such as internet publication, of providing information
regarding the use of agricultural biotechnology products and
avoidance of unintended consequences of such use to producers of
conventional crops and conventionally bred animals and to
agricultural biotechnology product users.
D. Human Health Harms
The protection of human health is a fundamental requirement for a
successful agricultural biotechnology regulatory system. Because
conventional agriculture and agricultural biotechnology may pose
comparable risks to health, assuming an improved regulatory system
(including provision for additional testing for potential human health
harms such as allergenicity and toxicity) and absent a permit
violation that caused the harm, agricultural biotechnology products
should be subject to liability for harm caused to human health only
under the same liability scheme and in those circumstances where a
conventional food producer would be subject to such liability.
Punitive damages should only be available for intentional or grossly
203. Consideration should be given, however, to whether in certain exceptional types of
cases traditional common law principles such as nuisance or trespass might continue to apply
even where only permitted releases occurred.
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negligent violations of regulatory requirements that cause significant
harm or in circumstances where such damages would be available
against a conventional agricultural food or feed producer.
X. CONCLUSION

Although agricultural biotechnology has the potential to provide
useful products, it also poses some new environmental and safety
risks in addition to some of the same risks posed by conventional
agriculture. The U.S. federal regulatory system clearly needs
improvement as a result of regulatory failures in the federal
government's control of agricultural biotechnology. If needed
regulatory improvements are made, tort liability for agricultural
biotechnology products should, in certain key respects, parallel the
rules governing tort liability for conventional agriculture, but may, in
specific cases, require more stringent liability standards. Taken
together, these reforms should be sufficient to permit the rational
development of agricultural biotechnology while ensuring
agricultural sustainability.

